


































































































































































































































































































































































Generational policy  – the government’s treatment of current and future 
generations  -- is a fundamental aspect of a nation’s fiscal affairs.  The policy involves 
two actions  – redistributing resources across generations and allocating to particular 
generations the burden of paying the government’s bills.  Taking from one generation to 
help another or forcing one generation to pay for another’s public goods raises a host of 
ethical as well as economic questions.  How much of the government’s bills should future 
generations be forced to pay? How should the government treat today’s elderly versus 
today’s young?  Should those born in the future pay more because they will benefit from 
improved technology? Can the government redistribute across generations? If so,  how 
does this work?  Does relieving current generations of fiscal burdens let them consume 
more and, thereby, reduce or crowd out national saving and domestic investment? Should 
the government try to pool risks across generations? 
Generational morality is  the province of philosophers.  But the positive questions 
surrounding the treatment of the old, the young, and unborn have captivated economists 
since the birth of the discipline.  Their work has firmly embedded the analysis of 
generational policy within t he broader theory of fiscal incidence.
1  This theory has three 
central messages. First, those to whom the government assigns its bills or designates its 
assistance are not necessarily those who bear its burdens or enjoy its help.  Second, the 
incidence of  policies ultimately depends on the economic responses they invoke.  Third, 
apart from changes in economic distortions, generational policy is a zero-sum game in 
                                                                 
1 For surveys of tax incidence see Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) and Fullerton and Metcalf (this volume).   3
which the economic gains to winners (including the government) equal the economic 
losses to losers.
2 
Because the gulf between policy goals and policy outcomes can be so large, 
incidence analysis is both important and intriguing.  This is particularly true for 
generational policy where a range of private responses can frustrate the government’s 
initiatives.  These include intra-family intergenerational redistribution, private changes in 
saving and labor supply, and the market revaluation of capital assets.  
The admonishment of incidence theory that policy descriptions bear no necessary 
relationship to policy outcomes is particularly apt in considering the traditional measure 
of generational policy, namely official government debt.  Notwithstanding its common 
use, official government debt is, as a matter of neoclassical economic theory, an artifice 
of fiscal taxonomy that bears no fundamental relationship to generational policy.    
In contrast to deficit accounting, which has no precise objective, a relatively new 
accounting method,  Generational accounting, attempts to directly assess generational 
policy.  Specifically, it tries to measure the intergenerational incidence of fiscal policy 
changes as well as understand the fiscal burdens confronting current and future 
generations under existing policy.  
Generational accounting represents but one way of trying to quantify the 
economic impacts of generational policy.  Another is computer simulation.   Each passing 
year sees the development of ever more sophisticated and carefully calibrated dynamic 
computer simulation models.  These virtual environments are simplifications of economic 
                                                                 
2 Changes (including reductions) in economic distortions include policy-induced changes in the economy’s 
degree of risk sharing to the extent that marginal rates of substitution and production are not equated across 
states of nature.    4
reality.  But they allow economists to conduct stylized controlled experiments in studying 
the dynamic impacts of generational policies.   
This chapter shows how generational policy works, how it is measured, and how 
much it matters to virtual as well as real economies.  To make its points as quickly and 
simply as possible, the chapter employs a two-period, overlapping generations model.  
This model is highly versatile.  It illustrates the central controversies surrounding 
generational policy, including its potential impact on national saving and its potential 
impotency due to  Ricardian Equivalence.  It exposes the vacuity of deficit accounting.  
And it elucidates the government’s intertemporal budget constraint that provides the 
framework for generational accounting.   
Section II begins the analysis by presenting the two-period life-cycle model, 
defining generational incidence, and showing the zero-sum nature of generational policy.  
Section III illustrates generational policy with  a simple example, namely a policy of 
redistributing, in a non-distortionary manner, to the contemporaneous elderly from the 
contemporaneous young as well as all future generations.  This example clarifies the 
difference between statutory and true fiscal incidence.  It also illuminates, as described in 
Section IV, the arbitrary nature of fiscal labels as well as their resultant fiscal aggregates, 
including the budget deficit, aggregate tax revenues, and aggregate transfer payments.  
Finally, it illustrates t he various guises of generational policy, including structural tax 
changes, running deficits, altering investment incentives, and expanding pay-as-you-go-
financed social security.  
Once this example has been fully milked, the chapter shows that its lessons about 
fiscal labels are general.  They apply when fiscal policy, in general, and generational   5
policy, in particular, is distortionary, when it is uncertain, when it is time inconsistent, 
and when segments of the economy are credit constrained.  Indeed, they apply to any 
neoclassical model with rational economic agents and rational economic institutions 
(including the government).  This demonstration sets the stage for Section V’s 
description, illustration, and critique of generational accounting.  This section also lays 
out the implications of generational policy for monetary policy.  
Because generational policies play out over decades rather than years and can 
have major macroeconomic effects, understanding their impacts is best understood 
through computer simulation analysis.  Section VI presents results from simulating two 
major generational policies  – changing the tax structure and privatizing social security.  
The messages of this section are that generational policies can have significant effects on 
the economy and the well being of different generations, but that such policies take a long 
time to alter the economic landscape.   
Having illustrated generational policy, its measurement, and the potential 
magnitude of its effects, the Chapter turns, in Section VII, to Ricardian Equivalence – the 
contention that generational policy, despite the government’s best efforts, just doesn’t 
work.  The alleged reason is that parents and children are altruistic toward one another 
and will use private transfers to offset any government attempts to redistribute among 
them.  Ricardian Equivalence has been assailed by theorists and empiricists.  These 
attacks have paid off.  As Section VII discusses, there are very good theoretical and 
empirical reasons to doubt the validity of Ricardian Equivalence, at least for the United 
States.  Section VIII considers the government’s role in improving or worsening   6
intergenerational risk sharing.  The final section, IX, summarizes and concludes the 
chapter. 
To conserve space, the chapter makes no attempt to survey the voluminous 
literature on generational policy.  But any discussion of the modern analysis of 
generational policy would be remiss if it failed to identify the four major postwar 
contributions to the field, namely Samuelson’s (1958) consumption-loan model, 
Diamond’s (1965) analysis of debt policies, Feldstein’s (1974) analysis of unfunded 
social security, and Robert Barro’s (1974) formalization of Ricardian equivalence.  These 
papers and their hundreds, if not thousands, of o ffspring collectively transformed the field 
from a collection of intriguing, but poorly posed questions to an extremely rich and 
remarkably clear set of answers.  
 
II. The Incidence of Generational Policy 
The Life-Cycle Model 
Consider a two-period, life-cycle model in which agents born in year s have utility 
Us defined over consumption when young, cys, consumption when old, cos+1, leisure when 
young, lys, and leisure when old, los+1.   
(1)  U u c c l l s ys os ys os = + + ( , , , ) 1 1  
For this dynamic economy, consumption and leisure from a point in time, say the 
beginning of time t, onward is constrained by a constant returns production function 
satisfying 
(2)   F c c g c c g l l T l l T k ot yt t ot yt t ot yt ot yt t ( , ,..., , ,..., ) + + + + + - + - = + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0,   7
where  gs is government consumption in year s, kt is the capital stock at the beginning of 
time t (before time-t production or consumption occurs), and T is the time endowment 
available to each generation in each period.
3  Since there are two generations alive at each 
point in time, the aggregate time endowment in each period is 2T.  The arguments of (2) 
are the net (of endowments) demands for consumption and leisure at time t and in all 
future periods plus the beginning of time t endowment of capital.   
Output is non-depreciable and can be either consumed or used as capital.  Since 
there are no future endowments of capital, only the time-t endowment of capital enters 
(2).  The fact that all of the leisure being demanded in a given period enters as a single 
argument independent of who enjoys this leisure implies that the amounts of labor 
supplied by d ifferent agents are perfect substitutes in production.   Finally, the fact that 
the aggregate time endowment (T) is constant through time reflects the simplifying 
assumption that each cohort is of equal size – the value of which is normalized to unity. 
Using the constant returns-to-scale property, the production function can be 
written as: 
(3)  ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ( )... c c g R c c g w l l R w l l ot yt t t ot yt t t ot yt t t ot yt + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
= + + + + +
k
R
w T R w T
t
t
t t t 2 2 1 1 ... , 
where  Rs+1 is the marginal rate of transformation of output in period s into output in 
period s+1 (the cost of an extra unit of output in period s+1 measured in units of output in 
period s); i.e.,  
 
                                                                 
3 To keep the notation simple, this presentation abstracts from uncertainty in leaving out subscripts that 









1  , 
and  ws  is the marginal rate of transformation of output in period s into leisure in period s 
(the cost of an extra unit of leisure in period s measured in units of output in period s), 
i.e., 







The terms Rs+1 and ws – the respective time-s marginal products of capital at time s+1 and 
labor at time s -- are referenced below as pre-tax factor prices.  
Equation (3) is the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint.  It requires that the 
value of current and future consumption and leisure, all measured in units of current 
consumption, not exceed the value of the economy’s current and future endowments, also 
measured in units of current consumption. 
In choosing their consumption and leisure demands, agents born in year  s‡t 
maximize (1) subject to: 
(6)    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + + + + - - + = + + + os s ys s s s os s s ys s os s ys h R h T w R T w l w R l w c R c , 
where hos is the net payment of the old at time s.  
Those agents born in t -1 maximize their time-t remaining lifetime utility subject 
to: 
(7)  c w l
a
R
w T h ot t ot
ot
t
t ot + = + -  
In (6) and (7), hys is the net payment to the government by the young at time s, and aot 
represents the net worth of the initial elderly at the beginning of time t.   
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The Government’s Intertemporal Budget Constraint 
Substitution of (6) and (7) into the economy-wide budget constraint (3) yields the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint: 
(8)
h h R h h R R h h g R g R R g
a k
R
ot yt t ot yt t t ot yt t t t t t t
ot t
t
+ + + + + + = + + + +
-
+ + + + + + + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) ... ...
 
The right-hand side of (8) is the government’s bills -- the present value of it current and 
future projected consumption plus its net debt, which equals the difference between total 
private-sector net worth and the economy’s aggregate capital stock, ( aot  - k t)/Rt.  The 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint requires that either current or future 
generations pay for the government’s bills, where its bills represent the sum of its 
projected future consumption plus its initial net debt.  As discussed below, different ways 
of labeling government receipts and payments will alter  hot  (the  remaining lifetime net 
payment, or  generational account, of the time-t elderly) and ( aot  - k t) /Rt by equal 
amounts.  In contrast, the lifetime net payments (the generational  accounts) facing initial 
young ( hyt+Rt+1hot+1) and future generations ( hys+Rs+1hos+1, , for s>t) are invariant to the 
government’s vocabulary; i.e., the fiscal burden on current and future newborns is well 
defined, whereas the government’s net debt is not.  
 
The Incidence of Generational Policy 
Suppose that at time t the government changes policy.  The policy change will 
affect the generation born at time t -1 (the initial elderly), the generation born at time t 
(the initial young), and all generations born after time t (the future generations).  The   10 
incidence of the policy for an affected generation born in year s is found by 
differentiating (1): 
(9)  dU u dc u dc u dl u dl s cys ys os lys ys los os = + + + + + + + cos 1 1 1 1 
For the initial elderly, s=t-1, and dcyt-1=0 and dlyt-1=0, since consumption and leisure that 
occurred before the policy changed is immutable.  
The incidence experienced by each generation born at for s ‡ t can be expressed 
in units of consumption when young by dividing (9) by the marginal utility of 

































Equation (10) traces generational incidence to changes in each generation’s consumption 
and leisure when young and old valued in terms of their consumption when young.   In 
the case of the initial elderly, the change in utility can be normalized by the marginal 
utility of consumption when old. 
 
The Zero-Sum Nature of Generational Policy 
Policy-induced changes in consumption and leisure experienced by the various 
generations alive at time t and thereafter must satisfy (11), which results from 
differentiating (2). 
(11) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ... dc dc dg R dc dc dg R R dc dc dg ot yt t t ot yt t t t ot yt t + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2  
+ + + + + + + = + + + + + + + + + w dl dl R w dl dl R R w dl dl t ot yt t t ot yt t t t ot yt ( ) ( ) ( ) ... 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 0   11 
Let  Et  stand for the sum over all generations alive from time t onward (including the 
initial elderly born in t-1) of policy incidence measured in units of time-t consumption.   




































Using (10) and (11), rewrite (12) as 
(13)  
 
E R R dc R R R dc w w dl w w dl t t
n






t yt = - + - + - + - + + + + + + + + ( ) ( ) ...( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
 




t t ot t yt
n




























There are two sets of terms on the right-hand-side of (13).  The first set involves 
differences between marginal rates of substitution (MRS) and marginal r ates of 
transformation (MRT) multiplied by a) the change in the economic choice being distorted 
and b) a discount factor.  These MRS-MRT wedges arise from distortionary fiscal 
policies and are often referred to as marginal tax wedges.  This first set of terms is 
related, but not strictly identical to, the present value of the marginal change in economic 
efficiency (the change in excess burden) arising from the policy.  The second set of terms 
measures the present value of the policy-induced change in the time-path of government 
consumption.   
Thus (13) shows that fiscal-policy incidence summed over across all current and 
future generations equals a) the present value of the time-path of terms related to policy-
R R w w dl dg R dg R R dg t t yt
n
t yt t t t t t t + + + + + + + + + + - + - - - - 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 ( ) ... ...  12 
induced changes in excess burden and b) the increase in the present value of government 
consumption.  Thus, apart from efficiency effects, any change in government 
consumption must be fully paid for in terms of reduced welfare experienced by current or 
future generations.  If the policy entails no efficiency change and no change in 
government consumption,  Et  equals zero, and the policy simply redistributes fiscal 
burdens across generations.  Hence, ignoring efficiency effects, policy changes are, 
generationally speaking, zero-sum in nature.  Either current or future generations must 
pay for the government’s spending and holding government spending fixed, any 
improvement in the wellbeing of one generation comes at the cost of reduced wellbeing 
of another generation.   
It’s important to note that (13) takes into account policy-induced changes in the 
time-path of factor prices.  Apart from efficiency considerations, (13) tells us that  all 
intergenerational redistribution, be it direct government intergenerational redistribution, 
arising from changes in the constellation of net payments it extracts from various 
generations, or indirect intergenerational redistribution, arising from policy-induced 
changes in the time-path of factor prices, is zero-sum in nature.   Stated differently, the 
benefits to particular g enerations arising from policy-induced changes in wage and 
interest rates are exactly offset by losses to other generations from such factor-price 
changes.  
Although the first set of terms in (13) involving MRS-MRT wedges arise only in 
the presence of economic distortions, their sum represents a precise measure of the 
change in excess burden only if the policy being conducted compensates all generations 
for the income effects they experience.  To show how this compensation could be   13 
effected, take the case o f a policy change that a) does not alter the time-path of 
government consumption, b) compensates members of each generation by keeping them 
on their pre-policy-change budget constraints, and c) does not require resources from 
outside the economy (i.e., leaves the economy on its intertemporal budget constraint).
4   
Since each generation remains on its initial budget constraint (defined in terms of 
its slope and intercept) the policy serves only to alter the choice of the position on that 
constraint.  This change in the consumption/leisure bundle arises because of the policy’s 
alteration in relative prices (i.e., because of changes in incentives).  Hence, each 
generation’s change in utility arises due to a change in how it allocates its budget, rather 
than a change in the size of its budget.  The resulting change in utility is a pure change in 
economic distortion.  Because these utility changes are measured in units of time-t 
output, adding them up, as (13) does, across all current and future generations indicates 
the amount (positive or negative) of time-t output that could be extracted from the 
economy by engaging in the policy, but using generation-specific non distortionary net 
payments that keep each generation at its pre-policy change level of utility.  
To keep each generation on its initial budget constraint, the government must alter 
the net amounts it takes from each generation when young and old to offset all policy-
induced income effects, including those arising from changes in relative prices of 
consumption and leisure when young and old.  Assuming, without loss of generality, that 
the amount of distortionary net payments made by each generation are offset by non 
distortionary net payments of equal magnitude, the only income effects to be offset are 
those arising from changes in relative prices.  This means setting dhot such that  
(15)  dh dw T dw l ot t t ot = -  
                                                                 
4 This is a Slutsky’s compensation in an intertemporal setting.   14 
and setting dhys and dhos+1 for s‡t such that 
 
(16) 
dh R dh dw T d R w T dR h dR c dw l d R w l ys s os s s s s os s os s ys s s os + = + - - - - + + + + + + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( )  
Does this compensation policy satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint? The answer is yes.  To see why, take the differentials of (3), (6), and (7).  
These equations plus (15) and (16) generate the differential of the government’s budget 
constraint.  Intuitively, the constant-returns property of the production function implies 
that factor-price changes are zero-sum in nature.  Hence, the government can redistribute 
resources from generations experiencing beneficial factor-price changes to those 
experiencing adverse factor-price changes.  This leaves each generation on its initial 
budget frontier, although, potentially, at a different point on that frontier. 
When one applies (15) and (16) in conjunction with a policy change that leaves 
government spending unchanged, the resulting consumption and leisure differentials in 
(13) are compensated ones.  For discrete, as opposed to infinitesimal, policy changes, one 
can integrate Et over the range of the policy change.  The resulting expression will be the 
present value sum of each period’s Harberger excess burden triangle, if there are no 
initial distortions in the economy.
5 
 
III.  Illustrating Generational Policy 
A Cobb-Douglas Example 
                                                                 
5 Were one to expand the above analysis to incorporate uncertainty about future states of nature, all 
commodities at a particular point in time would be indexed by their state of nature and the discrepancies 
between marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation would capture the absence of 
risk-sharing arrangements associated with incomplete insurance markets.    15 
  A very simple Cobb-Douglas two period life-cycle model suffices to illustrate 
how generational policy works and why it cannot be uniquely described with 
conventional fiscal taxonomy.  Let the utility of the young born at time s, Us, be given by: 
(17)    1 log ) 1 ( log + - + = ot yt s c c U a a . 
In (17), we make the assumption that labor supply is exogenous.  Specifically the young 
work full time, and the elderly are retired.  Also let the production function for output per 
worker satisfy: 
(18)   
b
t t Ak y =  
Each cohort has N members, so there is no population growth.  Finally, assume that the 
government takes an amount 
-
h f rom each member of each young generation and hands 
the same amount to each member of the contemporaneous old generation.  
  At any time t+1, capital per old person equals capital per worker, kt+1, because the 
number of old and young are equal.  The amount of capital held at t+1 by each old person 
is what she accumulated when young; i.e.,  
(19)    yt t t c h w k - - =
-
+1 . 
Given that consumption when young equals a share,  a, of lifetime resources, we can 
write (19) as: 











- - - =
t
t
t t t r
h r
w h w k a    16 
Finally, using the fact that factor prices equal marginal products, we can express (20) as: 
(21)        )
1





















t t t k A
h k A
h k A k . 
Equation (21) represents the transition equation for the capital labor ratio.  Knowing the 
value of kt, one can solve (by nonlinear methods) for the value of kt+1.   
 
The Crowding Out of Capital 
Consider introducing the policy at time 0.  Because a is between zero and one, the 
derivative of  kt+1 for t = 0 with respect to 
-
his negative evaluated at 
-
h equals zero.  
Hence, if we assume the policy is introduced at time 0, it reduces the economy’s capital 
stock at each future date.  What is the explanation for this crowding out of capital? The 
answer is the increased consumption of those who are old at the time of the reform – time 
0.  This cohort receives 
-
h for free; i.e., without being forced to hand over 
-
h when young.  
And the cohort immediately increases its consumption by 
-
h per person.   T his present 
value gain to the initial old is offset by a present value loss to the initial young and future 
generations of interest on 
-
h; i.e., if one discounts, at the time path of the marginal 
product of capital, the sum of all the losses of interest on 
-
hby the initial young and future 
generations, the total equals - 
-
h.     17 
If the losses to the current young and future generations are equal in present value 
to the gains to the initial old, why is there an initial (time 0) net increase in consumption 
and a decline in national saving? The answer is that the increased consumption by the 
elderly at time 0 is only partially offset by the reduced consumption of the 
contemporaneous young.  As just indicated, the contemporaneous young pay for only a 
small portion of the transfer to the initial elderly. Moreover, their propensity to consume, 
a, is less than one  – the propensity to consume of the initial elderly.  So the positive 
income effect experienced by the initial elderly exceeds in absolute value the negative 
income effect experienced by the initial young, who, in any case, have a smaller 
propensity to consume.  Hence, consumption of the initial elderly rises by more than the 
consumption of the initial young falls, thereby reducing national saving and investment.   
Although all future generations will be forced to reduce their consumption once 
they are born, that doesn’t matter to the time-0 level of national consumption and saving.  
Moreover, the r eason this policy has a permanent impact on the economy’s capital stock 
is that there are always generations coming in the future whose consumption has not yet 
been depressed because of the policy; i.e., at any point in time, say t, the cumulated 
policy-induced net increase in the economy’s aggregate consumption from time 0 
through time t is positive.  Another way to think about the policy is to note that as of time 
0 the old are the big spenders, whereas the young and future generations are the big 
savers.  Indeed, future generations have a propensity to consume at time 0 of zero.  So the 
policy redistributes resources at time 0 from young and future savers to old spenders.    
   18 
The Policy’s Incidence 
The incidence of the policy can be described as follows.   The elderly at time 0 
receive 
-
h, and since factor prices at time 0 are unchanged, they experience no reduction 
in the return they earn from their capital.  Hence, the policy unambiguously makes the 
initial elderly better off.  Next c onsider the young at time 0.  They give up 
-
h when 
young, but receive the same amount when old.  On balance, they lose interest on the 
-
h.  
This reduction in lifetime income is somewhat counterbalanced by the fact  the policy 
drives up the return they receive on their savings.  The reason is that the policy reduces k1 
relative to what it would otherwise have been.  (Note that while the policy alters k1 and 
subsequent levels of capital per workers, it doesn’t change  k0, which means it doesn’t 
change the wage earned by the initial young.)  Finally, consider those born at time 2 and 
thereafter.  Each of these generations loses interest on 
-
h.  In addition, each earns a lower 
wage on its labor supply  and a higher rate of return on its saving than in the absence of 
the policy.  On balance, these factor price changes make these generations worse off.   
Since there is neither government consumption nor economic distortions in this 
example, the policy, according to (13), is zero-sum across generations with respect to 
welfare changes.  Now the derivative of each generation’s utility has two components  – 
the change due to raising 
-
h(above zero) and the change due to policy-induced factor 
price changes.  If we measure these two components in present value (in units of time-0 
consumption) and add them up across all generations, equation (13) tells us that their sum 
is zero.  However, as indicated above, the sum across all initial and future generations of   19 
the first component  – the utility changes from raising 
-
h is, by itself, zero.
6  Hence, the 
present value sum of the utility changes experienced by initial and future generations 
from factor-price changes must also sum t o zero.  In concrete terms, this means that the 
gain to the initial young from receiving a higher rate of return in old age, measured in 
units of time-0 consumption, equals the sum of the net losses, measured in time-0 
consumption, incurred by subsequent g enerations from receiving a lower real wage when 
young plus a higher return when old.  
 
IV. Deficit Delusion and the Arbitrary Nature of Fiscal Labels 
  In presenting generational policy in the Cobb-Douglas model, no use was made of 
the terms “taxes,” “transfer payments,” “interest payments,” or “deficits.”  This section 
points out that there are an infinite number of equally uninformative ways to label the 
above policy using these words.  Each of these alternative sets of labels use the words 
“taxes,” “transfers,” “spending,” and “deficits” in conventional ways. Consequently, no 
set of labels has a higher claim to relevance than any other.    
  The choice of a particular set of fiscal labels to use in discussing the model (the 
choice of fiscal language) is fundamentally no different than the choice of whether to 
discuss the model in English or French.  The message of the model lies in its 
mathematical structure.  And no one would presume that that message would differ if the 
model were discussed in English rather than French.   
                                                                 
6 Recall that the present value sum of the loss of interest on 
-
h  by the initial young and future generations 
equals -
-
h  -- the gain to the initial elderly.   20 
Showing that fiscal labeling is, from the perspective of economic theory, arbitrary 
establishes that the “deficit” is not a well defined measured of generational or, indeed, 
any other aspect of fiscal policy.  It establishes the same point with respect to “taxes,” 
“transfer payments,” and “spending,” where spending consists of “transfer payments” and 
“interest payments on government borrowing.”  Since the “deficit,” “taxes,” “transfer 
payments,” and “spending” are, from the perspective of economic theory, content free, so 
too are ancillary fiscal and national income accounting constructs like “debt,” “national 
income,” “disposable income,” “personal saving,” and “social security.”  Given the 
ubiquitous use by governments and economists of  these verbal constructs to discuss, 
formulate, and evaluate economic policy, the import of this point cannot be overstated.  
 
Alternative Fiscal Labels 
   Consider first labeling the payment of 
-
h by members of the initial young and 
future generations as a “tax” and the labeling of the receipt of 
-
hby the initial and 
subsequent elderly as a “transfer payment.”  With these words, the government reports a 
balanced budget each period since “taxes” equal “spending.”  This is true despite the fact 
that the government is running a loose fiscal policy in the sense that it redistributes 
toward the initial old from the initial young and future generations.  Furthermore, the 
budget remains in balance regardless of whether the p olicy is extremely loose (
-
h is very 
large) or extremely tight (
-
h is negative and very large in absolute value).  
  As a second example, let the government (1) label its payment of 
-
hto the elderly 
at time 0 as “transfer payments,” (2) label its receipt of 
-
hfrom the initial young and   21 
subsequent generations as “borrowing,” and (3) label its net payment of 
-
hto each elderly 
generation from time s=1 onward as “repayment of principal plus interest in the amount 
of (1+rs) 
-
h less an old age tax of r s
-
h.”  While each old person starting at time 0 still 
receives 
-
h and each young person still hands  over 
-
h, with this alternative set of words 
the government announces that its running a deficit of 
-
hat time 0 since time-0 spending 
on transfer payments equals 
-
h and time-0 taxes equal zero.  At time 1 and thereafter, the 
deficit is zero since the old age tax equals the government’s interest payments (the only 
government spending).   Hence, the stock of debt increases from 0 to 
-
h at the beginning 
of time 1 and stays at that value forever. 
  The above two examples are special cases of the following general labeling rule: 
1) label the receipt from the young of 
-
has net borrowing from the young of m
-
h less a 
net transfer to the young o f (m-1)
-
h, 2) label the payment of 
-
h to the initial old as a 
transfer payment, and 3) label the payment of 
-
hto the old in periods s ‡1 as return of 
principal plus interest of m (1+rs)
-




h.  Note that in 
the first example, m equals 0.  In the second, m equals 1.  Also note that regardless of the 
value of m, the government, on balance, extracts 
-
h from the young each period and 
hands 
-
h over to the old each period.  
The government’s reported deficit at time 0 is m
-
h.  At time s ‡1, the reported 
deficit equals government spending on interest payments of m rs
-
h plus net transfer   22 
payments of (m-1)
-




h; i.e., the reported 
deficit in s‡1 is zero.  Hence, from time 1 onward, the stock of government debt is m
-
h.  
Since m can be any positive or negative integer, the government can choose language to 
make its reported debt for s‡1 any size and sign it wants.   
For example, if the government makes m equal to –30,000, it will announce each 
period that it is “taxing the young 30,001 
-
h and lending the young 30,000
-
h and, in each 
period s ‡1, that it is “receiving from the old principal and interest payments of 
30,000(1+rs)
-




h.  In this 
case, the government reports a surplus at time 0 of 3000
-
h.   
Thus, each choice of m corresponds to a different choice of fiscal language.  And 
since the government and private sector are always fully repaying those payments and 
receipts that are described as “government borrowing” and “government loans,” one 
choice of m is no more natural than any other from the perspective of everyday parlance.  
From the perspective of economic theory, the choice of m is completely arbitrary as well; 
i.e., the equations of the model presented above do not contain m. 
In addition to not pinning down the choice of m  at a point in time, the model’s 
equations provide no restrictions on changes in the choice of m through time.  Let m s 
stand for the choice of m applied to the receipt of 
-
h from the young at time s as well as 
the receipt of 
-
h by the old at time s+1.  So m s  references the language used to describe 
the fiscal treatment of generations s.  In this case, the deficit at time s will equal the 
quantity (ms–ms-1)
-
h.     23 
To summarize, regardless of the true size and nature of generational policy as 
determined by the size and sign of 
-
h, the government can announce any time-path of 
deficits or surpluses it chooses.  For example, the government can choose a sequence of 
ms  that makes its  reported debt grow forever at a faster rate than the economy.  This 
means, of course, that the debt to GDP ratio tends to infinitely.  It also means that the 
invocation in economic models of a transversality condition, which limits the ratio of 
debt to GDP, is a restriction about permissible language, not a restriction on the 
economy’s underlying economic behavior.  
At this point, an irritated reader might suggest that the above is simply an exercise 
in sophistry because as long as the government chooses its fiscal language (its m) and 
sticks with it through time, we’ll have a meaningful and consistent language with which 
to discuss fiscal policy.   
This is not the case.  Even if the government were to choose an m and stick with it 
through time, the resulting time path of government deficits would have no necessary 
connection to actual fiscal policy.  As we’ve seen in the above example, if the 
government chooses a large (in absolute value) negative value of m to label the 
-
hpolicy, 
it will announce over time that it has a huge level of assets, despite the fact that it is 
conducting loose policy.    Moreover, the government’s choice of fiscal labels isn’t 
sacrosanct.  The fact that the government has chosen a particular time-path for the value 
of m doesn’t preclude each individual in society from choosing her or his own time-path 
of m s in describing the country’s past and projected future fiscal affairs.  Each of these 
alternative time paths has the same claim (namely zero) to explaining the government’s 
actual past, present, and future fiscal position.  Indeed, those who wish to show that   24 
deficits crowd out capital formation need only define a time path of m s that produces a 
negative correlation between investment and the deficit.  And those who wish to show the 
opposite can choose a time path of ms that produces a positive correlation.   
Finally, unless the government’s fiscal policy is described in label-free terms, 
there is no way for the public to know what m the government has chosen or whether it is 
maintaining that choice through time.  In our simple model, the reported deficit depends 
on the current period’s choice of m, the previous period’s choice of m, as well as the size 
of 
-
h.  Without independent knowledge of 
-
h, the public can’t tell if the deficit is 
changing because of changes in fiscal fundamentals or simply because of changes in 
fiscal labels.  Nor can the public tell if the same labels are being used through time.   
 
Other Guises of Generational Policy 
  In the above discussion, we’ve indicated that the our 
-
h intergenerational 
redistribution policy can be conducted under the heading “pay-as-you-go” social security, 
“deficit-financed transfer payments,” or “surplus-financed transfer payments,” where the 
deficits or surpluses can be of any size.  This is not the limit of the language that could be 
used to describe the policy.  The policy could also be introduced under the heading of 
“structural tax reform.”  To see t his, suppose the government initially has in place a 
consumption tax that it uses to make transfers to the young and old which precisely equal 
their tax payments.  Now suppose the government switches from consumption to wage 
taxation as its means of collecting the same amount of revenue to finance the transfer 
payments.  Since the initial elderly are retired and pay no wage taxes, they will be 
relieved of paying any net taxes over the rest of their lives.  Hence, this reform   25 
redistributes to them from the i nitial young and future generations.  These latter 
generations find that the present value (calculated when young) of their lifetime net tax 
payments has been increased.   
  Our final example of fiscal linguistic license is particularly artful.  As discussed in 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), it involves the government engineering a stock market 
boom and, thereby, raising the price at which the elderly sell their capital assets to the 
young.  In so doing, the government can claim that market revaluation, rather than 
government policy, is responsible for improving the well being of the initial elderly at the 
cost of lower welfare for the initial young and future generations.  Since we want to 
describe this outcome as a particular labeling of our 
-
h policy, we need to clarify the 
difference between capital assets and consumption goods.  The difference arises not in 
the physical property of the two, since our model has only one good, but rather in the date 
the good is produced.  The economy’s capital stock at time t consists of output that was 
produced prior to time t.  And the government can tax or subsidize the purchase of output 
produced in the past differently from the way it taxes or subsidizes output produced in the 
present.   
In terms of the equations of our model, 
-
hstands for the higher price of capital 
(measured in units of consumption) that the young must pay to invest in capital.  It also 
stands for the higher price (measured in units of consumption) that the old receive on the 
sale of their capital to the young.   
How can the government engineer a stock market boom of this kind? The answer 
is by announcing a tax on the purchase of newly produced capital goods by the young.  
Since the young can either invest by buying new capital goods or by buying old capital   26 
from the elderly (the capital valued in the stock market), this will drive up the price of the 
capital the elderly have to sell to the point that the young are indifferent between the two 
options.  To avoid t he government retaining any resources, we can have it return to the 
young the equivalent of their investment tax payments, but in a lump-sum payment (a 
payment that is not related to the level of that investment.  This, plus a couple of 
additional elements that leave the effective tax rate on capital income unchanged, will 
make the “investment tax policy” differ in name only from conducting our benchmark 
policy under the alternative headings “pay-as-you-go social security,” “deficit-financed 
transfer payments to the elderly,” “surplus-financed transfer payments to the elderly,” 
and “structural tax change.”
7     
 
Generalizing the Point that the Deficit is Not Well Defined 
  The above illustration of the arbitrary nature of deficit accounting was based on a 
simple framework that excluded distortionary policy, economic as well as policy 
uncertainty, and liquidity constraints.  Unfortunately, none of these factors provide any 
connection between the measured deficit and fiscal fundamentals.    
 
                                                                 
7 To make this policy fully isomorphic to our benchmark policy, we need to include six elements: 1) a 
subsidy to capital income received by generation s when old that is levied at the same rate as the tax 
generation s pays when young on new investment, 2) a lump sum transfer paid to the elderly equal to the 
subsidy to capital income, 3) a lump sum transfer to the young equal to the proceeds of the investment tax, 
4) the setting of the investment tax rate each period to ensure that the net cost of purchasing the capital rises 
by exactly 
-
h, 5) if the elderly consume their own capital, the government provides them a subsidy at the 
same rate as the investment tax, and 6) if the young invest their own capital (the output they receive as 
wages), they will be forced to pay the investment tax.  Element 1 ensures that there is no change in the 
effective rate of capital income taxation under this description of the policy.  Elements 2 through 4 ensure 
that the budget constraints of the young and old each period are precisely those of the benchmark policy.  
Element 5 guarantees that the elderly are indifferent between consuming their own capital or selling it to 
the young, and element 6 guarantees that the young are indifferent between investing their own wages,   27 
Distortionary Policy 
  To see that distortionary policy has no purchase when it comes to connecting 
deficits with fiscal fundamentals, consider again the general model that includes variable 
first period and second period leisure and net payments from the young and old in period 
t to the government of  hyt and hot.  To introduce distortionary fiscal policy, we simply let 
hyt and hot depend on how much generation t decides to consume and work when young 
and old, respectively.  In maximizing its lifetime utility function subject t o (6) or (7), 
agents take into account the marginal dependence of  hyt and  hot+1 on their consumption 
and leisure demands and this marginal dependence helps determine the marginal prices 
they face in demanding these commodities.  
  Our model with distortionary policy thus consists of a) government-chosen time-
paths of the  hyt and  hot  functions and  gt  (government consumption demands) that satisfy 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, household demands for consumption 
and supplies of labor, and firms supplies of output and demands for capital and labor 
inputs.  Market clearing requires that, in each period along the economy’s dynamic 
transition path, a) firms’ aggregate output supply cover the consumption demands of 
households and the government plus the investment demand of firms and b) labor supply 
equals labor demand.   
The fact that we can formulate and discuss our model of distortionary fiscal 
policy making no use whatsoever of the words “taxes,” “transfer payments,” or “deficits” 
in itself tells us that the deficit has no connection to policy, even if that policy is 
distortionary.  But to drive home the point, consider labeling  hyt  as “government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
purchasing new capital for investment from other young people, or purchasing the capital owned by the   28 
borrowing” of m thyt from the young at time t less a “net transfer payment” to the young at 
time t of  (mt-1)hyt.  The corresponding labeling of the payment by the old of hot+1 would 
be labeled as “repayment of principal and interest” of  -mthyt (1+rt+1) (which is negative, 
because the government is doing the repaying) plus a “net tax payment” of  hot+1 + mthyt 
(1+rt+1).  Notice, that regardless of the size of m t, the net payments of generation t when 
young and old are hyt and hot+1, respectively and its generational account is hyt + Rt+1hot+1.   
Thus, the choice of the time path of the m ts makes no difference to economic outcomes, 
although it leads to a sequence of “official” deficits, dt, of 
(22)     1 1 - - - = yt t yt t t h m h m d . 
To make this math more concrete, suppose that the government finances its 
possibly time-varying consumption each period based on a net payment from the young 
of  hyt, which distorts each generation’s first-period labor supply.
8  How can observer A 
report that the government is taxing only the labor earnings of the young from time 0 
onward and always running a balanced budget? How can observer B report that the 
government runs a deficit of  hy1 at time 0? And how can observer C report that the same 
government runs a surplus of hy1 at time 0?   
The answer is that observer A sets m s  equal to zero for all s; observer B sets m 0 
equal to zero and m 1 equal to 1; and observer C sets m 0 equal to zero and m1 equal to -1. 
Observer A describes the government as taxing generation 1  when it is young on the 
amount it earns when young.  Observer B describes the government as taxing generation 
1 when it is old on the accumulated (at interest) amount it earns when young.  Observer C 
describes the government as taxing generation 1 when it is young on its labor supply by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
elderly.  
8 In this example, the net payment of the old each period is assumed to equal zero.    29 
more than the amount needed to cover government spending.  Observer C also describes 
the government as subsidizing generation 1  when it is old based on the accumulated (at 
interest) amount it earned  when young.   The key point here is that, although all three 
observers report different time-0 deficits, all three report that the government is imposing 
the same tax, at the margin, on labor supply when young. 
The labels of observers B and C may, at first, seem a bit strained because they 
entail stating that the government is collecting revenue or making subsidies in one period 
based on economic choices m ade in another.  There are, however, multiple and important 
examples of such elocution.  Take 401k, IRA, and other tax-deferred retirement accounts.  
The tax treatment of these accounts is expressly described as taxing in old age the amount 
earned when young plus accumulated interest on those earnings.  Another example comes 
from the Social Security System, which provides social security benefits in old age based 
on the past earnings of workers in a manner that connects marginal benefits to marginal 
past contributions.  A third example is the U.S. federal income tax which taxes social 
security benefits and thus, indirectly, taxes in old age the labor supplied by retirees when 
they were young.   
Moreover, such cross-period references aren’t essential.  Take B ’s observation 
that generation 1 pays zero taxes when young and ( 1+r2)hy1 taxes when old.  B can 
describe the zero taxes that generation 1 pays when young as “revenues from a tax on 
labor supply  when young less a lump-sum transfer payment made to the young at time 1 
of equal value.”  And B can describe the taxes generation 1 pays when old as a “lump 
sum tax.”
9   
                                                                 
9 Recall that, according to observer B, this second-period lump-sum tax is offset by the second-period 
repayment of principal plus interest on the government’s borrowing, so that the agent makes no net   30 
Although the model discussed above has only a single type of agent per 
generation, the argument about the arbitrary nature of fiscal labels is equally valid if 
agents are heterogeneous.  In this case, the net payments to the government, hyt and hot, 
will differ across agents.  If the government cannot observe individual characteristics, 
like innate talent, these functions will be anonymous.  On the o ther hand, the labeling 
convention  – the choice of  mt can be individual specific; i.e., we are each free to describe 
our own and our fellow citizens’ net payments to the government with any words we like.   
Ghiglino and Shell (2000) point out that if the g overnment were restricted in its 
choice of words to, for example, announcing only anonymous tax schedules, those 
restrictions might, in light of limits on reported deficits constrained the government’s 
policy choices.   This point and their analysis, while very important, is orthogonal to the 
one being made here, namely that whatever is the government’s policy and however the 
government came to choose that policy, it can reasonably (in the sense of using standard 
economic terminology) be described by men and women, who are not encumbered by 
government censors, as generating any time path of deficits or surpluses.    
 
Liquidity Constraints 
  Another objection to the above demonstrations that “deficit” policies are not well 
defined is that they ignore the possibility that some agents are liquidity constrained.  If 
some young agents can’t borrow against future income how can they be indifferent 
between a policy that involuntarily “taxes” them and one that voluntarily “borrows” from 
them? There are two answers.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
payment in the second period.  Thus, if the agent dies prior to reaching the second period, observer B can 
claim that the agent’s estate used the proceeds of the debt repayment to pay the second-period lump-sum   31 
First, the government can compel payments with words other than “taxes.”  For 
example, government’s all around the world are currently “reforming” their social 
security pension systems by forcing workers to “save” by making contributions to 
pension funds,  rather than by making social security “tax” contributions.  The 
governments are then “borrowing” these “savings” out of the pension funds to finance 
current social security benefit payments.  When the workers reach retirement, they will 
receive “principal  plus interest” on their compulsory saving, but, presumably, also face 
an additional tax in old age to cover the government’s interest costs on that “borrowing.”  
While this shell game alters no liquidity constraints, it certainly raises the government’s 
reported deficit.   
  The point to bear in mind here is not that governments may, from time to time, 
opt for different words to do the same thing, but, rather that any independent observer 
can, even in a setting of liquidity constraints, reasonably use alternative words to describe 
the same fundamental policy and, thereby, generate total different time-paths of deficits.  
The second reason why liquidity-constrained agents may be indifferent between 
“paying taxes” and “lending to the government” is due to Hayashi (1987).  His argument 
is that private-sector lenders are ultimately interested in the consumption levels achieved 
by borrowers since the higher those levels, the greater the likelihood that those who can’t 
repay will borrow and then default.  When the g overnment reduces its “taxes” on 
liquidity-constrained borrowers, private lenders reduce their own loans to those 
borrowers to limit the increase in their consumption.  Instead of lending as much as it did 
to its borrowers, the private lenders make loans t o the government.  Indeed, in 
equilibrium, the private lenders voluntarily “lend” to the government exactly the amounts 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
tax.    32 
the liquidity-constrained agents were otherwise sending the government in “taxes.”  
Hence, the borrowers find their private loans cut back by precisely their cut in taxes (i.e., 
they find their “tax cuts” being used to buy government bonds) and end up with the same 
consumption.  Thus, changing language will not alter the degree to which any agent is 
liquidity constrained since these constraints will themselves be determined, 
fundamentally, by the unchanged level and timing of the agents’ resources net of their net 
payments to the government.    
 
Uncertainty 
  A third objection to the proposition that fiscal labels are economically arbitrary 
involves uncertainty. “Surely,” the objection goes, “future transfer payments and taxes 
are less certain than repayment of principal plus interest, so one can’t meaningfully 
interchange these terms.”  In fact the risk properties of government payments and receipts 
provide no basis for their labeling; i.e., the deficit is no better defined in models with 
uncertainty than it is in models with certainty.  The reason is that any uncertain payment 
(receipt) 
~
X , where the ~ refers to a variable that is uncertain, can be relabeled as the 
combination of a certain payment (receipt) 
-




X .  So a net payment when young of hyt and an uncertain receipt when old of 
~
1 + ot h can be 
described as a net payment when young of hyt plus a certain old age receipt of hyt/Rt+1 less 
an uncertain receipt of 
~
1 + ot h - h yt/ R t+1.  Regardless of what one calls the uncertain 
component of t his receipt, there are, as we’ve seen, an infinite number of ways to label 
the certain payment when young and the certain receipt when old.  More generally,   33 
whatever are the risk properties of net payments that are labeled “borrowing” and 
“interest and principal repayment,” these same net payments can be labeled as “taxes” 
and “transfer payments.”  
  Take, as an example, Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes’ (1986) demonstration that “a 
tax cut coupled with a future income tax increase (that pays off the associated borrowing) 
can stimulate consumer spending” and that “the marginal propensity to consume out of a 
tax cut, coupled with future income tax increases, can be substantial under plausible 
assumptions.”  In their two-period life-cycle model, agents’ second period earnings are 
uncertain.  According to the way they label their equations, the government cuts taxes by 
an amount T when workers are young and repays its borrowing by taxing workers when 
old in proportion to their earnings.  Since agents have no way to insure their risky 
earnings, the policy provides an element of intragenerational risk sharing and, thereby, 
lowers precautionary saving and raises consumption when young. Barsky, Mankiw, and 
Zeldes view this increase in consumption in response to the “tax cut” as a Keynesian 
reaction to a Ricardian policy.  
  While the points Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes make about consumption under 
uncertainty are impeccable, their findings have nothing to do with “tax cuts,” “deficit 
finance,” or “the timing of taxation.”  One  can equally well describe their equations as 
showing that there is a sizeable and very non-Keynesian consumption response to a tax 
hike of size T.  How? By labeling the policy as “raising taxes on the young by T and 
making a loan to the young of T.”  When  the young are old, the government “receives 
loan repayments of T plus interest” but makes a “transfer payment” of 2T less an amount 
that is proportional to earnings at the same rate described by Barsky, et. al. as the tax rate.      34 
Time Consistency  
  Another question about the alleged arbitrary nature of fiscal labels is whether the 
timing of “taxes” is better defined in a setting in which government policy is subject to 
time-consistency problems.
10  One way to demonstrate that it is not is to show that time 
inconsistent policy can be modeled with no reference to “taxes,” “transfers,” or 
“deficits.”  Take, for example, an economy consisting of a generation that lives for two 
periods and is under the control of a time inconsistent government in both periods.  
Specifically, suppose the government has a social welfare function  Wy(u1,u2,… , un) that 
represents its preferences over the lifetime utilities of agents 1 through n when they are 
young.  Let  Wo(u1,u2,… , un) represent the government’s preferences when the agents are 
old.  Further, assume that agent  i’s utility is a function of her consumption when young 
and old,  ciy  and  cio,  her leisure when young and old,  liy  and l io, and her enjoyment of 
public goods when young and old, gy and go.  Thus, ui = ui(ciy,cio,liy,lio,gy,go).  When the 
cohort is old, the government will maximize  Wo taking as given the consumption and 
leisure and public goods that each agent enjoyed when young.   
If the Wo( , , , ) and Wy( , , , ) functions differ, the government’s preferences will 
be time inconsistent.  In this case, the young government (the government when the 
cohort is young), will realize that the old government will exercise some control over the 
consumption and leisure that agents will experience when old and use that control  to 
generate undesirable outcomes.  Consequently, the young government will use dynamic 
programming to determine how the old government will make its decisions and the ways 
in which it can indirectly control those decisions.   
                                                                 
10 Note that time consistency problems can be potentially resolved by having successive governments 
purchase consistent behavior from their predecessors.  See Kotlikoff, Persson, and Svensson (1988).   35 
The government, both when it i s old and young, can use non-linear net payment 
schedules to redistribute across agents and extract resources from agents.  If the 
government is not able to identify particular agents, these net payment schedules will be 
anonymous.  If government favors agents with particular unobservable characteristics, 
such as low ability, it will condition its net payments schedules on observables, such as 
earnings, that are correlated with those characteristics, and face self-selection constraitns 
as in Mirrlees (1971).   
The government’s second-period optimization is also constrained by the amount 
of second–period output, which depends on the economy’s second-period capital stock as 
well as agents’ second-period labor supplies.  The solution to this problem includes the 
choice of  go  and as well as agent-specific second-period values of consumption and 
leisure.  These choices are functions of second-period capital, and these functions are 
used by the young government in setting policy; i.e., the young government considers 
how its net payment schedules will affect the economy’s capital in the second period and, 
thereby, the consumption, leisure, and the public goods enjoyed by different agents when 
old.  In recognizing that the old government will control second-period outcomes, the 
young government formulates a time-consistent policy.   
 
An Example 
To make this point concrete, consider a simple model with two agents, a and b, 
both of whom would earn  w when young and old were they to work full time.  The young 
government supplies  2gy  and the old government  2go  in public goods.    The two   36 
governments differ with respect to their preferences over the utilities of the two agents, ua 
and ub.  Specifically, assume that a>.5 and that  
(23)  b a o u u W ) 1 ( a a - + =  
(24)  b a o u u W a a + - = ) 1 (  
Suppose that utility is separable in public goods, consumption, and leisure and that the 
utility of consumption and leisure is given by 
(25)  ) log (log log log io io iy iy i l c l c u + + + = q   for i = a and b 
It's easy to show using dynamic programming that the consistent solution entails 
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where R stands for 1 plus the rate of return.  A symmetric set of equations holds for the 
consumption and leisure of agent  b with  a replaced by  (1-a)  and  (1-a) replaced by  a.  
These government choices for consumption and leisure can be compared with the private 
choices that would arise in the absence of government policy.  Those private demands are 
found by setting  a, gy, and go to zero.  Compared to the no-policy setting, the interaction 
of the two governments distorts the intertemporal allocation of consumption and leisure 
of the two agents.  Agent  a (b) ends up with higher (lower) ratios of consumption when   37 
old to consumption when young and leisure when old to leisure when young.  The reason, 
of course, is that the old government redistributes toward agent  a, while the young 
government redistributes toward agent b.  
  Having worked out the best lifetime allocations that it can achieve given the old 
government’s ultimate control of second-period outcomes, the young government needs 
to implement this time-consistent solution.  Because it can announce non-linear as well as 
non-differentiable net payment schedules, the above allocation can be decentralized in an 
infinite number of ways. One way is to announce agent-specific lump-sum payments,  ha 
and  hb,  plus agent-specific payments per unit of expenditure on old-age consumption and 














) (  












) ( , 
where  








y a + - + + - = a a  














a p  






b p  
Note that the two lump-sum payments add up to the present value of the 
government’s purchase of public goods.  Also note that since a>.5, agent a faces a lower   38 
marginal payment on second-period expenditures than does agent  b.  It’s easy to  show 
that the marginal payments generate no net resources to the government.  
The fact that one can, as just shown, model time-inconsistent government 
preferences without resort to the terms “deficit,” “taxes,” or “transfer payments” indicates 
that whatever are the policies that arise in the model just described or in similar models, 
they can be labeled any way one wants.  Indeed, models of time consistency that cannot 
be relabeled freely may be predicated on fiscal irrationality.  Consider, in this respect, 
Fischer’s (1980) classic analysis of time-inconsistent capital-income taxation.   
Fischer’s model also features a single generation that consumes and works when 
young and old and a government that wants to provide public goods.  But unlike the 
above model, all generation members are identical.  Fischer permits his government to 
levy only proportional taxes on labor earnings when young and old and a tax on capital 
holdings when old.  These restrictions may seem benign, but they’re not.  Why? Because 
Fischer is saying that the old government can levy what from the perspective of the 
second period is a non-distortionary tax on capital, but that it  can’t levy the same non-
distortionary tax as part of a non-linear second-period earnings tax in which 
inframarginal earnings are taxed at a different rate than are marginal earnings.
11   
If one drops Fischer’s restriction and allows non-linear net payment schedules, his 
model collapses to the above model with  a=.5.  In this case the young and old 
governments agree and extract inframarginal net payments to pay for public goods.  
Hence, Fischer’s economy ends up in a first-best equilibrium, in which no margins of 
                                                                 
11 Suppose, for example, that Fischer’s old government levies a tax of 50 units of the model’s good on 
capital and a 15 percent proportional tax on labor earnings.  From the perspective of second-period agents, 
this is no different from a policy under which the government announces that it will not tax capital at all,   39 
choice are distorted.  This is a far cry from the third-best equilibrium Fischer proposes – 
an equilibrium in which the government can only tax second-period earnings in a 
distortionary manner and to avoid doing so, places very high, and possibly confiscatory 
taxes on agents’ capital accumulation.  Agents naturally respond by saving little o r 
nothing.   
Do Fischer’s restrictions, which he doesn’t justify, reflect economic 
considerations, or are they simply a subtle manifestation of fiscal illusion? One economic 
argument in their behalf is that the governments he contemplates don’t have the ability to 
observe individual earnings or capital holdings and are forced to collect net payments on 
an anonymous basis.  For example, the governments might be able to collect net 
payments from firms that are functions of the firms’ aggregate capital holdings and 
aggregate wage payments, but not be able to collect net payments from individual agents.  
This doesn’t immediately imply the absence of inframarginal labor earnings taxes since 
the governments could, in addition to taxing the firms’ total wage bill at a fixed rate, levy 
a fixed payment per employee on each firm, assuming the government can observe the 
number of employees.  But, for argument’s sake, let’s assume the government can’t 
observed the number of employees.  
In this case, can one still re-label fiscal flows in Fischer’s model without changing 
anything fundamental? The answer is yes.  Take the first of Fischer’s two third-best 
equilibria.  It entails a first-period proportional labor-earnings tax, a second-period 
proportional capital levy, and n o second-period labor-earnings tax.  Now starting from 
this tax structure, suppose the government wants to “run” a smaller surplus.  It can do so 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
but instead assess a 50 unit tax on the first dollar earned and a 15 percent tax on each dollar earned 
thereafter.   40 
by labeling first-period labor-income taxes of T y as “a first-period “loan” to the 
government of T y plus a “second-period tax” of (1+r)Ty, where r is the rate of interest.  
Since this second-period tax is calculated as a function of labor earnings when young, the 
re-labeling alters no incentives to work when young.  Nor does it change the 
government’s cash flows,  since the government still receives T y in the first period as a 
“loan” and uses the (1+r)Ty second-period “tax” receipt to repay “principal plus interest” 
on its first-period “borrowing.”  The government has no reason to either a) renege on 
repaying this debt or b) tax these debt holdings because in the second period it is getting 
all the receipts it needs from its non-distortionary capital levy.
12   
If the government is effecting its transactions through firms, it can borrow from 
firms in the first period,  repay the firms in the second period, and assess a tax in the 
second period on the firms based on their first-period wage payments. In this case, the 
firms will withhold and save enough of the worker’s first-period pre-tax wages so as to 
be able to pay these extra second-period taxes.  The firms will invest in the government 
bonds and use the proceeds of those bonds to pay off the additional taxes. 
Fischer’s alternative third-best tax structure entails a confiscatory tax on all 
physical capital accumulated  for old age and positive first- and second-period labor-
earnings taxes.  Can the government, also in this setting, postpone its taxes on first-period 
labor earnings and get the young, or the firms on behalf of the young, to lend it what it 
                                                                 
12 If the government wants, instead, to announce a larger first-period surplus, it can raise the first-period 
labor-income tax, lend the additional proceeds back to the young, and provide a second-period subsidy on 
first-period labor earnings paid for with the proceeds of the loan repayment. Again, the old government has 
no reason to renege on this second-period subsidy because it is already collecting all the resources it needs 
via the non-distortionary capital levy.  Alternatively, it can collect the second-period capital-income tax in 
the form of a first-period tax on the acquisition of assets and then lend these additional first-period receipts 
back to the young.   This leaves the net payment of the young unchanged, and the second-period repayment 
of principal plus interest on the loan gives the government the same second-period net receipts it has under 
its initial wording.    41 
would otherwise  have collected as first-period taxes? The answer is yes.  If the 
government reneges on its debt repayment in the second-period, by either repudiating the 
debt or levying a tax on holdings of debt, the old, or the firms on their behalf, won’t be 
able to repay the taxes that are due in the second-period on first-period labor earnings 
unless the government violates Fischer’s stricture against taxing second-period earnings 
at other than a fixed rate that is independent of the level of earnings.  To see this, note 
that taxes levied on first-period labor earnings are, from the perspective of the second 
period, lump-sum since first-period labor supply decisions have already been made.  So 
paying off the debt has no efficiency implications because the proceeds of this debt 
repayment are immediately handed back to the old government in the form of a lump-
sum tax.  If the government were to renege on its debt and also tax first-period labor 
earnings in the second period, it would force the old (the firms) to pay additional taxes 
from the proceeds of their second-period labor earnings (their second-period wage 
payments).  This would require a non-linear tax, which, again, is something that Fischer 
seems to have ruled out a priori. The non-linear tax in this case would be a fixed 
payment, independent of second-period labor earnings, plus a payment based on the level 
of second-period labor earnings.   
 
Voluntary vs. Involuntary Payments 
  A final issue is whether the voluntary nature of private purchases of government 
bonds  makes debt labels meaningful.  This proposition is indirectly advanced in a very 
interesting article by Tabellini (1991) on the sustainability of intergenerational 
redistribution.  In his model, the government wants to finance uniform transfer payments 
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to  young parents by extracting payments from a subset of them, namely those that are 
rich.  Unfortunately, Tabellini’s government can’t observe endowments, and were it to 
force all young parents to make the same payment, it would defeat its purpose.  Instead, 
the government “borrows” from young parents, with the result that only those young 
parents with large endowments voluntarily “lend” to the government.  Tabellini notes that 
these loans will be repaid when these rich parents are old. Why? Because their children 
will join with them in voting for debt repayment since much of that repayment will come 
from the children of the poor.  In the course of showing that intragenerational distribution 
considerations can help enforce intergenerational redistribution, Tabellini claims that this 
same policy could not be implemented through a social security system, because a social 
security tax would be compulsory.  
I disagree for the simple reason that social security tax payments need not be 
compulsory.  Instead of announcing that is “borrowing,” Tabellini’s government could 
equally well announce a payroll tax that is the same function of the young parents’ 
endowment as is their debt purchases.  The government would also announce social 
security benefit payments that are s et equal to the tax contributions plus the market rate 
of return that would otherwise be paid on government bonds.  True, the government can't 
force the parents, when they are young, to pay social security taxes because the 
government can't observe the parent's initial endowments.  But there is no need to enforce 
the tax collection; the same parents who would otherwise have purchased debt will want 
to pay the tax because it will ensure them an old age social security benefit in a setting in 
which they have no other means to save for old age.     43 
Note that in many countries, payroll tax payments are in large part voluntary.  
Workers can choose to work in the formal sector and pay those taxes or they can choose 
to work in the informal sector and not pay.  Another way to think about “enforcing” the 
“tax” is for the government to announce a penalty, namely, disqualification from receipt 
of the old-age transfer payment, so that formal-sector workers could choose not to 
contribute without the fear of being sent to jail.  Note also that with this alternative 
labeling, the children of the rich will want to enforce the payment of social security 
benefits because their parents will otherwise lose out to the benefit of the children of the 
poor.  
With Tabellini’s fiscal labels (case a), the government reports a deficit when the 
parents are young. Under mine (case b), it reports a balanced budget.  If it wanted to 
report a surplus, it could a) announce a social security tax schedule that was, say, double 
what would it announce in case b, but also announce that it would make loans to all tax 
payers equal to one half of their tax contributions.  When old, in this case c, the parents 
would get twice the social security benefits that they'd get in case b, but they would have 
to pay back their loans with interest.  If the government in Tabellini’s model wants to 
report an even larger deficit (case d), it could borrow twice as much and announce that it 
would provide a special transfer payment to its lenders equal to, say, one half of the loans 
they provide. When old, these lenders would face an extra tax, equal to the special 
transfer plus interest, with the proceeds of this tax subtracted out of the government's 
repayment to the lenders.     44 
In each of these cases, the net flows between each parent and the government in 
each period is the same, so the voting choices of the young won't change. The only 




Implications for Empirical Analyses of Deficits, Personal Saving, and Portfolio Choice 
The above demonstration that government debt and deficits are not well defined 
has serious implications for the vast time-series literature that purports to connect these 
aggregates to consumption, interest rates, and other macroeconomic variables.  This 
literature is reviewed in Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998).  The problem with these studies 
is that they use wholly arbitrary measures of deficits and debts, which could just as well 
be replaced by other equally arbitrary measures that have the opposite  correlation with 
the dependent variable.  Moreover, in the absence of any theoretical ground rules for 
measuring the deficit, Eisner and Pieper (1984) and other economists have felt free to 
”correct” the U.S. federal deficit in ways that substantiate their priors about the impact of 
deficits on the economy.  
Empirical analysis of personal saving suffers from the same shortcoming.  The 
measurement of personal saving is predicated on the measurement of personal disposable 
income, which, in turn, depends on the measurement of taxes and transfer payments.  
Since taxes and transfer payments can be freely defined, the nation’s personal saving rate 
can be anything anyone wants it to be.  This fact casts a pall on studies like those of   45 
Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) and Gale and Scholz (1999) that purport to 
“explain” or, at least illuminate, changes over time in the nation’s rate of personal saving.  
Finally, if government debt is not well defined, then the division of private 
portfolios between stocks and bonds, including government bonds, is a matter of opinion, 
not fact.  This calls into question studies that purport to identify risk preferences and 
other portfolio determinants based on the shares of portfolios invested in bonds versus 
stocks.    
 
V. Generational Accounting 
Generational accounting was developed by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 
(1991) in response to the aforementioned problems of deficit accounting.  The objective 
of generational accounting’s is to measure the generational incidence of  fiscal policy as 
well as its sustainability and to do so in ways that are independent of fiscal taxonomy.  
Generational accounting compares the lifetime net tax bills facing future generations with 
that facing current newborns.  It also calculates the changes in generational accounts 
associated with changes in fiscal policies.  Both of these comparisons are label-free in the 
sense that generate the same answer regardless of how government receipts and payments 
are labeled.  
Although academics have spearheaded development of generational accounts, 
much of the work has been done at the governmental or multilateral institutional level.  
The U.S. Federal Reserve, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, H.M. Treasury, the B ank of Japan, the Bundesbank, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Italy, the New Zealand Treasury, the   46 
European Commission
13, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank have all 
done generational accounting.  Much of the interest in generational accounting by these 
institutions stems from the projected dramatic aging of OECD countries coupled with the 
commitments of OECD governments to pay very high levels of social security and health 
care benefits to the elderly.   
Generational accounting has also drawn considerable interest from academic and 
government economists.  Haveman (1994), Congressional Budget Office (1995), Cutler 
(1993), Diamond (1996), Buiter (1997), Shaviro (1997), Auerbach, Gokhale, and 
Kotlikoff (1994), Kotlikoff (1997), R affelhuschen (1998), and others have debated its 
merits. 
Much of the interest in generational accounting is motivated by the extraordinary 
aging of industrial societies that will, over the next few decades, make almost all of the 
leading countries around t he world look like present-day retirement communities.  
Population aging per se is not necessarily a cause for economic concern, but population 
aging in the presence of high and growing levels of government support for the elderly 
makes early attention to the long-term fiscal implications of aging imperative.  
While generational accounting is a natural for old and aging countries, developing 
countries, like Mexico and Thailand, which don’t face aging problems, have their own 
reasons for examining generational accounting.  In particular, they realize that their 
relative youth means they have more current and future young people to help bear 
outstanding fiscal burdens and that viewed through the lens of generational accounting, 
                                                                 
13 The European Commission has an ongoing project to do generational accounting for EU member nations 
under the direction of Bernd Raffelhueschen, Professor of Economics at Freiburg University.  See 
Raffelhueschen (1998).    47 
their fiscal policies might look much more responsible relative to those of the developed 
world.   
This section lays out generational accounting’s methodology, shows alternative 
ways of measuring generational imbalances, stresses the importance of demographics in 
generational accounting, discusses practical issues in constructing generational accounts, 
shows examples of generational accounts and measures of generational imbalances, 
points out the connection between generational accounting and traditional tax incidence 
analysis, and mentions, along the way, a variety of concerns that have been raised about 
this new form of fiscal appraisal.  
 
The Method of Generational Accounting 
Equation (36) rewrites the government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
(equation 8) in terms of the generational accounts of current and future generations.  
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In (36), Nt,k stands for the per capita generational account in year t of the generation born 
in year k.  For generations currently alive,  Nt,k  denotes per capita remaining lifetime net 
taxes discounted to the current year t.  For generations not yet born,  Nt,k  refers to per 
capita lifetime net taxes, discounted to the year of birth.  The term  Pt,k stands for the 
population in year t of the cohort that was born in year k.  This first summation on the 
left-hand side of (36) adds together the  generational accounts  of future generations, 
discounted at rate  r  to the current year t.  The second summation adds the accounts of   48 
existing generations.  In actual applications of generational  accounting, separate accounts 
are calculated for males and females, but this feature is omitted from (36) to limit 
notation.  
The first term on the right-hand side of (36) expresses the present value of 
government purchases.  In this summation the values o f government purchases in year s, 
given by  Gs, are also discounted to year t.   The remaining term on the right-hand side, 
g
t D , denotes the government's explicit net debt  – its financial liabilities minus the sum of 
its financial assets and the market value of its public enterprises based on whatever 
arbitrary language conventions the government has adopted.    
 
The Precise Formula for Generational Accounts 
The generational account Nt,k is defined by: 
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where k=max(t,k).  The term  Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payment to the 
government made in year s by a member of the generation born in year k. 
   
The term  Ps,k/Pt,k  indicates the proportion of members of cohort k alive at time t 
who will also be a live at time s.
14  Thus, it represents the probability that a particular 
member of the year-k cohort who is alive in year t will survive to year s to pay the net 
taxes levied, on average, in that year on year-k cohort members.  Hence,  Nt,k  is an 
actuarial p resent value.  It represents the average value in the present of the amount of 
                                                                 
14 The population weights Ps,k incorporate both mortality and immigration, implicitly treating immigration 
as if it were a “rebirth” and assigning the taxes paid by immigrants to the representative members of their 
respective cohorts.  This approach does not, therefore, separate the burdens of natives and immigrants.  See   49 
net taxes that members of cohort k will pay in the future, where the averaging is over not 
just net tax payments, but also survivorship.      
 
What Do Generational Accounts Exclude? 
Note that generational accounts reflect only taxes paid less transfer payments 
received.  With the exception of government expenditures on health care and education, 
which are treated as transfer payments, the accounts do not impute to particular 
generations the value of the government's purchases of goods and services.  Why not? 
Because it is difficult to attribute the benefits of such purchases.  Therefore, the accounts 
do not show the full net benefit or burden that any generation receives from government 
policy as a whole, although they can show a generation's net benefit or burden from a 
particular policy change that affects only taxes and transfers.  Thus generational 
accounting tells us which generations will pay for the government spending not i ncluded 
in the accounts, rather than telling us which generations will benefit from that spending.  
This implies nothing about the value of government spending; i.e., there is no 
assumption, explicit or implicit, in the standard practice of generational accounting 
concerning the value to households of government purchases.
15  
 
Assessing the Fiscal Burden Facing Future Generations  
Given the right-hand side of equation (36) and the second term on the left-hand-
side of equation (36), generational accountants d etermine, as a residual, the value of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Ablett (1999) and Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999) for applications of generational accounting that make 
that separation as well as study a variety of fiscal issues associated with immigration.  
15 Raffelhüschen (1998) departs from this conventional approach t o generational accounting of not 
allocating the benefits of government purchases.  Instead, he allocates these purchases on a per-capita basis.     50 
first term on the left-hand side of equation (36) -- the collective payment, measured as a 
time-t present value, required of future generations.  Given this amount, one can 
determine the average present value lifetime net tax payment of each member of each 
future cohort under the assumption that these lifetime net tax payments rise for members 
of each successive future cohorts at the economy's rate of labor productivity growth, g.  
Now, if labor productivity grows a t g percent per year, so will real wages.  Hence, the 
lifetime labor income of each new cohort will be g percent larger than that of its 
immediate predecessor.  So, in assuming that each successive cohort pays lifetime net 
taxes that are g percent larger t han those of its predecessor, one is assuming that each 
successive future cohort pays the same share of its lifetime labor income in net taxes; i.e., 
one is assuming that each future cohort faces the same lifetime net tax rate.    
Let 
_
N stand for the growth-adjusted generational account of future generations.  
_
N is the amount each member of a future cohort would pay in lifetime net taxes if her 
lifetime labor income were the same as that of a current newborn.  The actual amount the 
cohort born in year t+1 will pay is 
_
N (1+g).  The actual amount the cohort born in year 
t+2 will pay is 
_
N (1+g)
2.  The actual amount the cohort born in year t+3 will pay is 
_
N (1+g)
3, and so on.     
Equation (38) can be used to solve for 
_
N . 
(38)                   
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_
N is the lifetime net tax payment of future generations adjusted for growth, so it is 
directly comparable to that of current n ewborns,  Nt,t.    This comparison is also label-free 
because alternative labeling conventions leave unchanged lifetime net payments.  If 
_
N equals  Nt,t,  generational policy is balanced.  If 
_
N exceeds (is smaller than) Nt,t, future 
generations face larger (smaller) growth-adjusted lifetime net tax burdens than do current 
newborns.  
The assumption that the generational accounts of all future generations are equal, 
except for a growth adjustment, is just one of many assumptions one could make about 
the distribution across future generations of their collective net tax payments to the 
government.  One could, for example, assume a phase-in of the additional fiscal burden 
(positive or negative) to be imposed on future generations,  allocating a greater share of 
the burden to later future generations and a smaller share to earlier ones.  Clearly, such a 
phase-in would mean that generations born after the phase-in period has elapsed would 
face larger values of lifetime burdens (the Nt,ks) than we are calculating here. 
 
Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance 
Another way of measuring the imbalance in fiscal policy is to ask what immediate 
and permanent change in either a) government purchases or b) a specific tax (such as the 
income tax) or transfer payment (such as old-age social security benefits) would be 
necessary to equalize the lifetime growth-adjusted fiscal burden facing current newborns 
and future generations.  Because such policies satisfy the government’s intertemporal   52 
budget constraint, they also sustainable.   
To be more precise about this type of calculation, suppose one wants to find the 
immediate and permanent percentage reduction in government purchases needed to 
achieve generational balance.  Denote this percentage reduction by  z.   Next, use equation 
(39) to solve for z under the assumption that 
_
N equals Nt,t.  
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As a second example, consider the immediate and permanent percentage increase in 
income taxes needed to achieve generational balance.  Call this percentage increase  v.
16  
To determine the size of  v, try different immediate and permanent income tax hikes until 
you find the one with the following property: given the new values of generational 
accounts (the values inclusive of the tax hike), the calculated value of 
_
N equals Nt,t.    In 
contrast to the calculation of  z, in this calculation of  v, N t,t, the generational account of 
current newborns, is not held fixed.  Like the accounts of all other existing generations, 




                                                                 
16 To introduce v in equation (4) we’d have to express the generational accounts of current generations as a) 
the present value of their future tax payments minus b) the present value of their future transfer payments 
and simply multiply the expression for the present value of future tax payments by (1+v).   53 
The Role of Demographics 
  As can be seen in equations (23)-(26), demographics play a central role in 
determining the  size of the imbalance in generational policy.  Other things equal, the 
larger the population sizes of future generations, the smaller will be the size of 
_
N , and, 
therefore, the smaller will be the imbalance of generational policy.  Ceteris paribus, larger 
population sizes of current generations will raise or lower 
_
N depending on the sign of the 
generational accounts these population totals are multiplying.  For example, if the 
generational accounts of those over age 65 a re negative, larger numbers of older people 
will make the calculated value of 
_
N larger.  A negative account means that the 
government will, under current policy, pay more to a generation in transfer payments 
than it receives in taxes.  Negative generational accounts for older generations is the 
norm in industrialized countries because these generations receive more in state pension, 
health, and other benefits over the remainder of their lives than they pay in taxes.   
  What is the impact o f the large number of baby boomers on generational 
imbalance? Since these generations typically still have positive generational accounts, 
they are contributing, on balance, to lowering the size of 
_
N  and, thus, the imbalance in 
generational policy.  On the other hand, since these generations are close to receiving 
large net transfers from the government, the current values of their generational accounts 
are quite small.  Hence, the contribution they are making toward lowering 
_
N  is small.  
This is the channel through which the very sizable benefits that are due to be paid in 
retirement to the enormous baby boom generation in industrialized countries constitute a   54 
fiscal burden on young and future generations.   
 
Inputs to Generational Accounting 
Producing generational accounts requires projections of population, taxes, 
transfers, and government purchases, an initial value of government net debt, and a 
discount rate.  Since generational accounting considers all levels of government  -- local, 
state, and federal  -- the measures of taxes, transfers, and government purchases must be 
comprehensive.  Government infrastructure purchases are treated like other forms of 
purchases in the calculations.  Although such purchases provide a n ongoing stream, 
rather than a one-time amount, of services, they still must be paid for.  Generational 
accounting clarifies which generation or generations will have to bear the burden of these 
and other purchases.  Government net debt is calculated net of the current market value of 
state enterprises.  This value is determined by capitalizing the net profits of those 
businesses.  In contrast to the treatment of the market value of state enterprises, 
government net debt does  not net out the value of the g overnment’s existing 
infrastructure, such as parks, highways, and tanks.  Including such assets would have no 
impact on the estimated fiscal burden facing future generations because including these 
assets would require adding to the projected flow of government purchases an exactly 
offsetting flow of imputed rent on the government’s existing infrastructure.   
Taxes and transfer payments are each broken down into several categories.  The 
general rule regarding tax incidence is to assume that taxes are borne by those paying the 
taxes, when the taxes are paid: income taxes on income, consumption taxes on 
consumers, and property taxes on property owners.  There are two exceptions here, both   55 
of which involve capital income taxes.  First, as detailed in Auerbach,  Kotlikoff, and 
Gokhale (1991), one should, data permitting, distinguish between marginal and infra-
marginal capital income taxes.  Specifically, infra-marginal capital income taxes should 
be distributed to existing wealth holders, whereas marginal capital  income taxes should 
be based on future projected wealth holdings.  Second, in the case of small open 
economies, marginal corporate income taxes are assumed to be borne by (and are 
therefore allocated to) labor.  The general rule for allocating transfer payments is to 
allocate them to those who directly receive them.   
  The typical method used to project the average values of particular taxes and 
transfer payments by age and sex starts with government forecasts of the aggregate 
amounts of each type of tax (e.g., payroll) and transfer payment (e.g., welfare benefits) in 
future years.  These aggregate amounts are then distributed by age and sex based on 
relative age-tax and age-transfer profiles derived from cross-section micro data sets.  For 
years beyond those for which government forecasts are available, age- and sex-specific 
average tax and transfer amounts are generally assumed to equal those for the latest year 
for which forecasts are available, with an adjustment for growth.   
  Equation (40) helps clarify the method of distributing annual tax or transfer 
aggregates in a particular year to contemporaneous cohorts.  Again, to simplify the 
presentation we abstract from the distinction between sexes that we consider in the actual 
calculations.   
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In (40), Ht stands for an aggregate tax or transfer amount in year t.  Let’s assume it stands 
for total income tax payments to make the example concrete.  The term Tt, is the average   56 
amount of income tax paid in year t.  Rt,t-s  is the relative distribution profile for income 
taxes in year t.  Specifically, it stands for ratio of the average income tax payment of 
members of the cohort born in year  t-s to the average income tax payment in year t.   
Finally, Pt,t-s stands for the number of people in year t who were born in year t-s, i.e., it is 
the population size of the age  t-s  cohort. Given  Ht  and the values of the Rt,t-s and Pt,t-s 
terms, one can use equation (41) to solve for  Tt.  To form  Tt,t-s, the terms that enter 
equation (37) that are used to calculate each current generation’s account, note that  
(41)      s t t R t t T   =   s t t T - - , , , . 
 
Discount Rates and Uncertainty 
For base-case calculations, generational accountants typically use a real rate of 
discount around 5 percent, a rate that exceeds the real government short-term borrowing 
rate in most developed countries.  This rate seems justified given the riskiness of the 
flows being discounted.  However, the “right” discount rate to use is in sufficient 
question to merit presenting results based on a  range of alternative discount rates  – a 
practice routinely followed by those constructing generational accounts. 
The appropriate discount rate for calculating the present value of future 
government revenues and expenditures depends on their uncertainty.  I f all such flows 
were certain and riskless, it would clearly be appropriate to discount them using the 
prevailing term-structure of risk-free interest rates.  However, even in this simple and 
unrealistic case, such discounting could be problematic since it would require knowing 
the values of this term structure.  To discern these values, one might examine the real 
yields paid on short-term, medium-term, and long-term inflation-indexed government   57 
bonds.  But this presupposes the existence of such bonds.  Many countries do not issue 
indexed bonds, and those that do don’t necessarily issue indexed bonds of all maturities.  
In the realistic case in which countries’ tax revenues and expenditures are uncertain, 
discerning the correct discount rate is even more difficult.  In this case, discounting based on the 
term structure of risk-free rates (even if it is observable) is no longer theoretically justified.  
Instead, the appropriate discount rates would be those that adjust for the riskiness of the stream in 
question.  Since the riskiness of taxes, spending, and transfer payments presumably differ, the 
theoretically appropriate risk-adjusted rates at which to discount taxes, spending, and transfer 
payments would also differ.  This point carries over to particular components of taxes, spending, 
and transfer payments, whose risk properties may differ from those of their respective 
aggregates.
17  Moreover, if insurance arrangements are incomplete, the appropriate risk 
adjustments would likely be generation-specific.  Unfortunately, the size of these risk adjustments 
remains a topic for fortune research.  In the meantime, generational accountants have simply 
chosen to estimate generational accounts for a range of discount rates. 
 
Illustrating Generational Accounts -- the Case of the U.S. 
In their recent calculation of U.S. generational accounts, Gokhale, Page, Potter, 
and Sturrock (2000) used the latest long-term projections of The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) with one modification.  They assumed that U.S. federal discretionary 
                                                                 
17 To see this, consider a government policy in the two-period life-cycle model of borrowing from the 
young at time t and using the proceeds to purchase stock from the young.  When the young are old the 
government repays the principal it borrowed by selling its shares and making up the difference between its 
interest obligations and the return (including capital gain) on its stock as a net tax payment.  This entire set 
of transactions entails no net payments from the government to generation t either when it is young or old.  
However, net tax payments will, on average, be negative when generation t is old, since stocks average a 
higher return than bonds.  If one discounts the safe and risky components of the net tax payments at their 
appropriate and different risk-adjusted discount rates, the present value of future net tax payments will be 
zero.  This is what one would want generational accounting to show, since the policy simply involves the 
government borrowing stock from the young and returning it (including its return) when they are old; i.e., 
the policy entails no increase in lifetime net payments.  But were one to mistakenly discount the total of   58 
spending would grow with the economy. Table 1 reports generational accounts on this 
basis, constructed using a 4.0 percent real discount rate and assuming a 2.2 percent rate of 
growth of labor productivity.  This discount rate is roughly the current prevailing rate on 
long-term inflation-indexed U.S. government bonds, and the productivity growth rate is 
the one currently being projected by the CBO.  The accounts are for 1998, but are based 
on the CBO projections available as of January 2000.  
  Table 1 shows, for males and females separately, the level and composition of the 
accounts.  Recall that the accounts are present values discounted, in this case, to 1998.  
As an example, consider the $112,300 account of 25 year-old males in 1998.  This 
amount represents the present value of the net tax payments that 25 year-old males will 
pay, on average, over the rest of their lives.   
The generational accounts for both males and females peak at age 25 and become 
negative for females at age 50 and for males  after at age 60.  The accounts for those 
younger than age 25 are smaller because they have a longer time to wait to reach their 
peak tax-paying years.  The accounts are also smaller for those above age 25 because 
they are closer in time to receiving the bulk of their transfer payments.  By age 10 for 
males and age 30 for females, Medicare and Social Security benefits are the two most 
important forms of transfer payments, if one uses the government’s fiscal taxonomy.   
The only figures in this table that aren’t a function of labeling conventions are the 
lifetime net tax rate of future generations and of newborns.  The denominators in these 
lifetime tax rates are the present value of lifetime earnings.  And they are constructed by 
pooling the net tax payments  and labor earnings of males and females.  In the case of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
expected net taxes in old age at a single discount rate, the value of the change in the generational account 
would be non zero.    59 
future generations, the present value to 1998 of all future net taxes of all future 
generations is divided by the present value to 1998 of the labor earnings of all future 
generations.   
 
The Imbalance in U.S. Generational Policy 
For newborns the lifetime net tax rate is 22.8 percent.  For future generations it is 
32.3 percent.  So future generations face a lifetime net tax rate that is 41.6 percent higher 
than that facing current newborns.
18  Stated d ifferently, future generations, according to 
current policy, are being asked to pay almost a dime more per dollar earned than are 
current newborns.   
In thinking about the magnitude of the U.S. generational imbalance, it’s important 
to keep in mind that the lifetime net tax rate facing future generations under current 
policy assumes that  all  future generations pay this same rate.  If, instead, one were to 
assume that generations born, say, over the next decade are treated the same as current 
newborns, the n et tax rate for generations born in 2010 and beyond would be higher than 
32.3 percent.   
 
Policies to Achieve Generational Balance in the U.S. 
  Table 2 considers five alternative policies that would achieve generational balance 
in the U.S.  The first is a 31 percent immediate and permanent rise in federal personal and 
corporate income taxes.  Had the U.S. adopted this policy in 2000, the federal surplus 
                                                                 
18 This is a very sizeable imbalance, but it’s nevertheless smaller than the imbalance estimated in 
the early 1990s. The decline in the imbalance reflects policy changes and much more optimistic long-term 
fiscal projections.  
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reported by the government for that year would have more than doubled.  Hence, based 
on the government’s fiscal language, the year-2000 surplus was far too small compared to 
that needed to achieve generational balance.  
Rather than raising just federal income taxes, one could raise all federal, state, and 
local taxes.  In this case, an across-the-board tax hike of 12 percent could deliver 
generational balance.  Cutting all Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, 
unemployment insurance benefits, welfare benefits, housing support, and other transfer 
payments by 21.9 percent is another way to eliminate  the generational imbalance.  Two 
final options considered in the table are immediately and permanently cutting all 
government purchases by 21 percent or cutting just federal purchases by 66.3 percent.   
Cutting government purchases to achieve generational  balance would leave future 
generations paying in net taxes the same 22.8 percent share of lifetime earnings as current 
newborns are expected (under current policy) to pay.  In contrast, either raising taxes or 
cutting transfer payments would mean higher lifetime net tax rates for those now alive. 
As Table 2 indicates, these alternative policies would leave newborns and all future 
generations paying roughly 27 cents out of every dollar earned in net taxes. This net tax 
rate is over 4 cents more per dollar earned than newborns are now forced to pay.  The 
payoff from having newborns as well as everyone else who is currently alive pay more in 
net taxes, is a reduction in net tax rate facing future generations by 5 to 6 cents per dollar 
earned.  
 
Achieving Generational Balance in 22 Countries   61 
The United States is certainly not alone in running imbalanced generational 
policies.  Table 3, abstracted from Kotlikoff and Raffelhüschen (1999), reports alternative 
immediate and permanent policy changes that would achieve generational balance in 21 
countries.  According to the second column in the table, 13 of the 22 countries need to cut 
their non-educational government spending by over one fifth if they want to rely solely 
on such cuts to achieve generational balance.  T his group includes the United States and 
Japan and the three most important members of the European Monetary Union: Germany, 
France, and Italy.  Four of the 13 countries – Austria, Finland, Spain, and Sweden -- need 
to cut their non-education purchases by  more than half, and two countries -- Austria and 
Finland  – need to cut this spending by more than two thirds!   Bear in mind that 
generational accounting includes regional, state, local, and federal levels of government.  
So the cuts being considered here are equal proportionate cuts in all levels of government 
spending.   
Not all countries suffer from generational imbalances.  In Ireland, New Zealand, 
and Thailand future generations face a smaller fiscal burden, measured on a growth-
adjusted basis, than do current ones given the government’s current spending projections.  
Hence, governments in those countries can spend more over time without unduly 
burdening future generations.  There are also several countries in the list, including 
Canada and the United K ingdom, with zero or moderate generational imbalances as 
measured by the spending adjustment needed to achieve perfect balance.  What explains 
these tremendous cross-country differences? Fiscal policies and demographics differ 
dramatically across countries.  The U.S., for example, has experienced and is likely to 
continue to experience rapid health-care spending.  Japan’s health care spending is   62 
growing less rapidly, but it’s aging much more quickly.  The United Kingdom has a 
policy of keeping most transfer payments fixed over time in real terms.  Germany is 
dealing with the ongoing costs of reunification.   
One alternative to cutting spending is cutting transfer payments.  In Japan, 
education, health care, social security benefits, unemployment benefits, disability 
benefits, and all other transfer payments would need to be immediately and permanently 
slashed by 25 percent.  In the U.S., the figure is 20 percent.  In Brazil, it’s 18 percent.  In 
Germany, it’s 14 percent.  And in Italy it’s 13 percent.   These and similar figures for 
other countries represent dramatic cuts and would be very unpopular.   
So too would tax increases.  If Japan were to rely exclusively on across-the-board 
tax hikes, tax rates at all levels of government (regional, state, local, and federal) and of 
all types (value added, payroll, corporate income, personal income, excise, sales, 
property, estate, and gift) would have to rise overnight by over 15 percent.  In Austria and 
Finland, they’d have to rise by over 18 percent.  If these three countries relied solely on 
income tax hikes, they had to raise their income tax rates by over 50 percent!  In France 
and Argentina, where income tax bases are relatively small, income tax rates would have 
to rise by much larger percentages.  In contrast, Ireland could cut its income tax rates by 
about 5 percent before it needed to worry about over burdening future generations.  The 
longer countries wait to act, the harder will be their ultimate adjustment to fiscal reality. 
As an example, the United Kingdom needs to raise income taxes by 9.5 percent if it acts 
immediately.  But if it waits 15 years, the requisite income tax hike is 15.2 percent.   
 
How Well Does Generational Accounting Measure True Fiscal Incidence?   63 
One concern about generational accounting is the accuracy of its implicit 
incidence assumptions.  Fehr and Kotlikoff (1997) use the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) 
dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model, described below, to compare changes in 
generation accounts with true fiscal incidence.  Tables 3 and 4, taken from their paper, 
use the closed-country version of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model to illustrate the 
relationship between changes in generation’s utilities, measured in units of current 
consumption, and changes in their generational accounts.  The tables consider the effect 
of a shift in the tax structure.  Specifically, the economy switches from having a 20 
percent income tax to having a 15 percent income tax plus a consumption tax where the 
revenue loss from lowering the income-tax rate is covered by the consumption tax.  
Government spending on goods and services is held fixed per capita in the simulation.  
  In the first year of the economy’s transition the consumption tax rate is 6.4 
percent.  Over time it drops to 6.1 percent.  In the long run, the economy’s capital stock, 
wage rate, and interest rate end up 8.2 percent higher, 2.1 percent higher, and 5.6 percent 
lower, respectively.   This crowding-in of the capital stock reflects the shift in the tax 
burden from initial young and future  generations to initial older generations. Table 4 
shows how key economic variables evolve other time in the model. 
Table 4 compares changes in generational accounts with the true policy incidence.  
As is clear from the table, generational accounts, in this case, do a very good job in 
capturing the general pattern of the generation-specific utility changes.  They do less well 
for certain generations in capturing the precise magnitude of their welfare changes.  The 
changes in generational accounts match up fairly closely to the changes in utility for 
those initially over age 25.  For younger and future generations, the match is much less   64 
good.  In this simulation, generational accounting provides a lower bound estimate of the 
absolute change in welfare of those born in the long run.  The reason is that policy that 
raise the economy’s capital stock are generally policies that redistribute from the initial 
old to the initial young and future generations.  Since a higher long-run degree of capital 
intensity means  a higher long-run wage, the direct redistribution from those alive in the 
long run, captured by generational accounting, will understate the improvement in 
welfare of those born in the long run.  In addition to missing this long-run general 
equilibrium action, Fehr and Kotlikoff show that generational accounting, as 
conventionally applied, omits the efficiency gains and losses arising from fiscal reforms.  
For particular reforms these efficiency effects can be important components of the 
policy’s overall incidence effects.  Fehr and Kotlikoff conclude that the incidence 
assumptions used in generational accounting needs to be augmented to incorporate both 
efficiency and general equilibrium feedback effects.  
 
Generational Accounting and Monetary Policy  
  One  of the net taxes that are allocated in forming generational accounts is the 
seignorage the government collects from the private sector in printing and spending 
money.  When it prints and spends money, the government acquires real goods and 
services, but it also precipitates a rise in the price level that would not otherwise have 
occurred.  This real gain to the government is a loss to the private sector that comes in the 
form of a reduction in the real value of their holdings of money.  
The government can a lso garner resources from the private sector by deflating the 
real value of its official nominal liabilities as well as implicit nominal transfer payment   65 
obligations.  On the other hand, it can lose resources by deflating away the real value of 
tax receipts that are fixed in nominal terms.  Finally, governments can use the printing of 
money and its associated inflation to reduce the real value of their spending on goods and 
services to the extent this spending is fixed in nominal terms. Each of the ways in  which 
governments use monetary policy as a fiscal instrument can and have been incorporated 
in generational accounting.  For example, the hidden seignorage tax is allocated across 
cohorts by using data on average real money balances by age and sex. 
Generational accounting can also be used to help determine the likely course of 
future monetary policy.  Countries with very large generational imbalances are countries 
that are likely to have to print large quantities of money to help “pay” their bills.  Indeed, 
generational accounting can be used to determine the amount of money creation needed 
to achieve a generationally balanced and sustainable policy.  Hence, generational 
accounting should be of as much importance and interest to monetary authorities as it is 
to fiscal authorities.  
 
VI. Simulating Generational Policy 
The advent of high-speed computers has transformed generational policy analysis.  
Today researchers around the world are constructing large-scale dynamic simulation 
models to assess how policy changes would affect macroeconomic outcomes as well as 
the intra- and intergenerational distributions of welfare.
19  This section illustrate the 
                                                                 
19  Arrau (1990), Hamann (1992), Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), Raffelhuschen (1989, 1993), Huang, 
He, Selo ⁄mrohoro￿lu, and Thomas Sargent (1997), Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995, 1998a, 
and 1998b), Altig and Carlstrom  (1996), Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1997, 1998), Hirte and Weber 
(1998), Schneider (1997), Fougere and Merette (1998, 1999), Merette (1998), Lau (1999), Knudsen, 
Pedersen, Petersen, Stephensen, and Trier (1999), Bohringer, Pahlke, and Rutherford (1999), and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1999) are examples in this regard. 
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effects of two generational policies  – the wholesale shift from income to consumption 
taxation and the wholesale p rivatization of social security, with the accrued liabilities of 
the old system financed via a consumption tax.  Both of these policies effect major 
redistributions across generations.  Indeed, it is hard to contemplate policies with greater 
potential to redistribute across generations.  
There are three key questions that these and similar simulations address.  First, 
how large are the macroeconomic effects of policies of this magnitude? Second, how 
long does it take for these effects to occur? Third, how l arge are the welfare changes 
visited on different generations as well as on particular members of those generations?  
The illustration is based on the Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Smetters-Walliser (AKSM) 
model.  The AKSM model descended from the Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (1987) (AK) model.  
The AK model featured 55 overlapping generations with a single representative agent in 
each cohort.  Unlike the steady-state and myopic transition models developed by Upton 
and Miller (1974), Kotlikoff (1979), Summers (1981), Seidman (1983), Hubbard and 
Judd (1987), and others, the AK model solved for the economy’s perfect foresight 
transition path.  The solution is found using an iterative convergence algorithm that 
begins by guessing the time-paths of factor demands, endogenous tax rates, and other key 
endogenous variables.  The algorithm then uses these guesses to generate the time-path of 
factor prices and marginal net prices.  These variables are fed into the supply side of the 
model where households determine how much to save and work.  These micro decisions, 
when aggregated, deliver a time-path of economy-wide factor supplies that is compared 
with the initial guess of the time-path of factor demands.  If the supply of factors equals 
the demand for factors each period, a dynamic equilibrium has been determined.    67 
Otherwise, the algorithm averages the initial guessed time-path of factor demands and the 
associate time-path of factor supplies to form a new guess of the time-path of factor 
demands, and the iteration continues.  
The AKSM model uses the same solution technique of the original AK model, but 
it differs in two important respects.
20  First, it follows the lead of Fullerton and Rogers 
(1993) by incorporating intra- as well as intergenerational inequality.  Specifically, the 
model p osits 12 different earnings groups within each cohort.  The groups are labeled 1 
through 12, with earnings higher for groups referenced with a higher number.  Groups 1 
and 12 represent the lowest and highest 2 percent of earners.  Groups 2 and 11 are the 
next lowest and next highest sets of earners, but each constitutes 8 percent of earners.   
And groups 3 through 10 each constitute 10 percent of earners.  The new model also 
approximates U.S. fiscal institutions much more closely.  Second, it includes an array of 
tax-base reductions, a progressive Social Security system, and a Medicare system.  
 
Switching from Income to Consumption Taxation 
Tables 5 and 6, extracted from Altig, et. al. (2001), shows some of the AKSW 
model’s results from simulating the complete replacement of the current U.S. personal 
and corporate federal income taxes with an equal revenue proportional consumption tax.  
Given the above discussion of deficit delusion, it’s important to point out that the term 
“revenue” here is based on the U.S. federal government’s fiscal language.  Under 
alternative labeling conventions, reported tax revenue would be dramatically larger or 
smaller than what the government says it is collecting and a “revenue-neutral” switch in   68 
tax bases, which did not try to p reserve the same changes in generational accounts and 
economic incentives, would have different economic effects.  That said, the tax reform 
considered here entails a major redistribution across generations because it confronts 
those rich and middle class  retirees alive at the time of the reform with a much greater 
remaining lifetime net tax burden than would otherwise be the case.  Low-income retirees 
are, on the other hand, largely insulated from the policy because their social security 
benefits are adjusted in the model to retain their original purchasing power.  
Table 5 reports macroeconomic effects, while Table 6 shows welfare effects for 
five of the twelve lifetime earnings classes.  Note that income class 1 refers to the poorest 
members of each cohort (those with the smallest endowment of human capital), and 
income class 12 refers to the richest members of each cohort (those with the largest 
endowment of human capital.)  The horizontal axis locates cohorts by their years of birth 
measured relative to t he reform, which occurs in year zero.  The welfare change are 
measured as equivalent variations, specifically the percentage change in full remaining 
lifetime economic resources that an agent living under the old policy regime (living in the 
initial steady state) would need to achieve the same level of remaining lifetime utility as 
she/he experiences under the new policy.  
  The macroeconomic effects of the tax reform are significant.  In the long run, the 
economy’s capital stock, labor supply, and output are larger by 25.4 percent, 4.6 percent, 
and 9.4 percent, respectively.  However, getting reasonably close to this new steady state 
takes a while.  For example, achieving half of the ultimate increase in the capital stock 
takes about 15 years.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 There is also a new demographic version of the AKSM model (Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser 2000), 
not used here, that provides a much more realistic modeling of fertility and lifespan than in the original AK   69 
The policy’s capital deepening raises pre-tax wages by 4.6 percent and lowers the 
pre-tax return to capital by 100 basis points. The expansion of the economy permits a 
decline in the consumption tax rate from an initial rate of 16.6 percent to a final rate of 
14.5 percent.  Measured on a wage-tax equivalent basis, the long-run consumption tax 
rate is 12.7 percent. This is substantially below the initial steady-state’s 21.4 percent 
average marginal tax rate on wage income.  It’s even further below the 34.0 percent peak 
marginal wage tax faced by those in the top earnings class.    
  As Table 6 shows, the tax reform effects a major redistribution across generations, 
but one that differs markedly for the lifetime poor and rich.  In forcing rich (e.g., earnings 
class 12) initial retirees to pay a high consumption tax rate, the policy, in effect, taxes 
their accumulated wealth.  This lowers their remaining lifetime utility.
21  In contrast, 
members of this earnings class that are born in the new long-run steady state experience a 
4 percent increase in their lifetime utilities measured relative to their welfare in the 
absence of the reform.  For the lowest earnings class, the generational incidence pattern is 
the opposite.  The initial poor retirees experience a small welfare improvement, but future 
members of this class are worse off.  The reason is that the consumption-tax structure is 
much less intragenerationally progressive than the original income-tax structure.  The 
generational incidence pattern for the other earnings groups in the top (bottom) half of the 
earnings distributions is similar, but less pronounced than that for earnings group 12 (1).      
 
Social Security’s Privatization 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
model and that can initial simulations from non steady-state positions.  
21 The simulated model includes capital adjustment costs, which limit the economic losses to initial elderly 
generations. The reason is that they own much of the economy’s existing capital stock and this capital   70 
The U.S. Social Security System faces a grave long-term financial crisis, the full 
dimension of which is not well known.  Paying out benefits on an ongoing basis requires 
an immediate and permanent increase of roughly 50 percent in the OASDI payroll tax 
rate.
22  The United States is now embarked in a national debate about how to save Social 
Security.  Options here include cutting benefits, raising the payroll tax, and privatizing all 
or part of the system by allowing people to contribute to individual accounts.  The key 
issues in this debate are how any policy, including maintaining the status quo, will affect 
the macro economy as well as rich and poor members of current and future generations.   
Table 7 extracted from Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), illustrate the A -
K OLG Model’s analysis of the effects of social security’s privatization.  The table 
considers privatizing the U.S. system and financing the 45-year transition, during which 
social security benefits are gradually phased out, with a consumption tax.  The policy 
generates sizeable long-run increases of 39 percent and 13 percent i n the economy’s 
capital stock and output, respectively.  But the half-life of the policy is 30 years, roughly 
twice the half-life of the tax reform just considered.  The transition takes longer because 
the policy phases in gradually over time.   
Table 8 shows that these long-run gains are not free.  They come at the price of 
lower utility to initial older and middle-aged generations.  All those alive in the long run, 
including the richest (group 12) and poorest (group 1) agents, are better off.  Since the 
system being privatized features a highly progressive benefit schedule, but also a highly 
regressive tax schedule (due to the ceiling on taxable earnings), the fact that the long-run 
poor are better off is particularly interesting.  It shows that paying off the existing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
experiences a rise in its relative price because it is a relatively scarce factor with respect to installing 
additional capital.    71 
system’s benefit liabilities in a more progressive manner (by making initial rich and 
middle income elderly contribute to that cause) outweighs the loss the long-run poor 
incur from not receiving benefits based on social security’s progressive benefit schedule.   
The long-run poorest earnings group experiences a 6.0 percent rise in lifetime 
utility.  This is a substantial welfare change; it means that were social security not to be 
privatized, providing this group with the same welfare improvement would require a 6 
percent increase in their consumption and leisure in each year they are alive.  The long-
run richest earnings group enjoys a 4.4 percent improvement in its lifetime utility.  The 
biggest winners from the reform are those in the upper middle classes (groups 6 though 
9) alive in the long run.  Their welfare gains are roughly 8 percent.  Like their poorer 
contemporaries, these groups enjoy the higher real wages delivered by the privatization.  
But the removal of social security means more because, compared with their 
contemporaries, they faced the highest rate of lifetime net social security taxation.  The 
costs of delivering these long-run welfare gains are visited on the initial middle-class and 
high-income elderly as well as all initial workers.  The largest losses amount to about 3 
percent of remaining lifetime resources.   
The two simulations just presented provide a sense of the maximum potential 
macroeconomic and redistributive effects of generational policy.  The reasons are a) the 
policies are radical, b) they entail major intergenerational redistribuiton, and c) they 
significantly improve marginal economic incentives to work and save.  But as described 
in Altig, et. al. (2001) and Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), the benefits available 
to future generations from tax reform or social security’s privatization can easily be 
dissipated by providing transition relief to early generations.  In the case of consumption-
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tax reform, such relief could come in the form of exempting the initial elderly from 
paying taxes when they purchase consumption with existing assets.
23 In the case of 
privatizing social security, transition relief could come in the form of the delaying the 
imposition of a new tax to cover the loss of revenues arising from having workers make 
their social security contributions to private accounts.  Such a policy permits workers 
close to retirement to gain at the expense of subsequent generations.  
 
VII. Ricardian Equivalence 
Ricardian equivalence refers to the proposition that private intergenerational 
transfers will undo government intergenerational transfers making generational policy 
entirely ineffectual and generational accounting a waste of time.  The proposition is 
appropriately attributed to David Ricardo who, i n discussing whether to borrow or tax to 
finance a war, wrote that “in point of economy, there is no real difference in either of the 
modes …”
24 More precisely, in comparing a one-time war tax of £1,000 and a perpetual 
tax of £50 to pay interest on borrowing of £1,000, Ricardo said that “if he (the payee) 
leaves his fortune to his son, and leaves it charged with this perpetual tax, where is the 
difference whether he leaves him £20,000, with the tax, or £19,000 without it?”
25   
While Ricardo realized that bequests could be raised or lowered to undo 
government intergenerational redistribution, he was skeptical that such behavior would 
arise in practice.  For in his next sentence he says “The argument of charging posterity 
                                                                 
23 If consumption taxation was instituted (i.e., labeled) by the government as a tax on income with 100 
percent expensing of new investment/saving (i.e., as taxing output minus saving,  which equals 
consumption), transition relief could come in the form of grandfathering the investment incentives provided 
to existing capital under the prior tax structure.   
24 Ricardo (1951), 4:185-6.  Also see O’Driscoll’s (1977) discussion of why Ricarado rejected Richardian 
equivalence as an empirically relevant phenomenon.    
25 Ricardo (1951), 4:187.    73 
with the interest on our debt, or of relieving them from a portion of such interest, is often 
used by otherwise well informed people, but we confess we see no weight in it.”
26  
 
Barro’s Proof of the Irrelevance Proposition 
Ricardo would presumably have included Robert Barro (1974) in the category of 
“otherwise well informed people,” notwithstanding the latter’s elegant and influential 
derivation of the former’s irrelevance proposition.  Barro’s derivation begins by positing 
that the utility of one generation depends not only on the goods (including leisure) it 
consumes over its lifetime, but also the utility of its children.  In the two-period model, 
this function is 
(42)    ) , , , , ( 1 1 1 + + + = t ot yt ot yt t u l l c c u u . 
Writing the corresponding expression for  ut+1 and substituting into (42) and then doing 
the same for  ut+2 and all other future utility functions leads to the following infinite 
horizon utility function whose arguments consist of all future values of consumption and 
leisure: 
(43)     ,...) , , , , , , , ( 2 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + = ot yt ot yt ot yt ot yt t l l c c l l c c u u    
Thus, Barro’s simple and seemingly quite natural formulation of intergenerational 
altruism has the striking implication that those alive today will care not only about their 
own levels of consumption and leisure, but also the consumption and leisure of their 
children, grandchildren, and all subsequent descendents.  The generation alive at time t 
takes its inheritance, bt, as given and chooses consumption when young and old as well as 
bequests (or intervivos transfers) when old, bt+1, to maximize (43) subject to  
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where Rs+1 discounts flows at time s+1 to time s.   
To make Barro’s point about the irrelevance of generational policy, (44) includes 
a policy, announced at time t, of giving an amount  hs  at time  s‡t+1  to the 
contemporaneous old and taking that same sum from the contemporaneous young.  The 
generation alive at time  t+1  faces the analogous budget constraint, except it includes the 
receipt when young of the government’s net payment.   
(45)   ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 T w h R T w h b b l w c R l w c t t t t t t t ot t ot t yt t yt + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + - = + + + +  
If one solves for  bt+1 in (45) and substitutes for that variable in (44), the terms involving 
ht+1 drop out.  The resulting expression now involves  bt+2, which can be eliminated by 
solving for  bt+2 from the time  t+2 version of (45).  Doing so leads  ht+2 to drop out.  
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The extended family maximizes (43) subject to (46).  Since all the terms involving the 
government’s generational policy have dropped out of (46), generational policy has no 
impact whatsoever on the economy.  Operationally, the extended family nullifies 
generational policy by raising its bequests at time  s‡t+1  by  hs.  Note that  hs  can be 
positive or negative.  Generations that receive a positive net payment when old bequeath 
these receipts to their children.  The children, in turn, use this inheritance to make their 
net payments to the government; i.e., the children’s payment to the government is given   75 
to their parents who hand it back to the children.  Since bequests can be negative as well 
as positive, we can also describe the change in bequests as the children reducing their 
own private transfers to their parents. If the government’s net payment to the elderly is 
negative, the elderly will respond by cutting back on their bequests to their children; 
alternatively, their children will hand the positive net payment they receive from the 
government to their parents.   
 
Theoretical Objections to the Barro Framework 
Barro’s model ignores four interrelated issues whose consideration undermine, if 
not vitiate, his result.  First, the model ignores marriage.  Second, it ignores differences in 
preferences among extended family members.  Third, it assumes symmetric information 
across family members about each others’ incomes.  Fourth, it ignores uncertainty.  
The fact that it takes two to tango means that marriage entails at least two sets of 
parents, both of which may be altruistically linked to the married couple, but  may have 
no particular interest in each other.  One way to model intergenerational transfers in this 
context is to assume that each set of in-laws takes the other’s transfers to their children as 
given.  But as shown in Kotlikoff (1983) and Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), this Nash 
assumption implies the effective altruistic linkage of the two sets of in-laws.  And if the 
in-laws have other children, the original in-laws will become altruistically linked with the 
all of the other children’s in-laws as well.  Hence, if altruism were as widespread as Barro 
posits, essentially everyone would be altruistically interlinked with everyone else around 
the world as a consequence of marriage within groups and intermarriage across racial, 
ethnic, religious, and national lines.     76 
The resource sharing arising from altruistic linkage means that each interlinked 
household’s consumption and leisure is determined by the collective resources of all 
extended family members.  State differently, the distribution of resources across extended 
family members makes no difference to the distribution of consumption and leisure of 
those members.  Thus, the Barro model implies that the consumption of a randomly 
chosen person in Nashville, Tennessee should depend on the income of a randomly 
chosen person in Almati, Kazakhstan.   
  The source of this patently absurd prediction is the assumption that each extended 
family takes the transfers of other extended family members as given.  The difficulty with 
this assumption becomes apparent if one compares two parties who each care so strongly 
about each other that each wants to transfer to the other.  Taking each other’s transfers as 
given may lead to an infinite handing back and forth of funds between the two parties; 
i.e., the problem may have no solution.  Of course, in the real world, such situations are 
handled by would-be recipients simply refusing to receive the funds they are handed.  As 
Kotlikoff, Razin, and Rosenthal (1990) point out, the power to refuse a transfer if it is too 
big or, indeed, if it is too small as well as the power to refuse to make a transfer is 
someone else’s transfer is too small or too large changes the bargaining game 
fundamentally.  In particular, threat points matter and Ricardian Equivalence no longer 
holds because when the government redistributes across generations, it alters their threat 
points.     
  Conflicts over who loves whom and by how much may also lead parties to 
withhold information about their economic positions.  Kotlikoff and Razin (1988) point 
out that a ltruistic parents trying to transfer to children whose abilities and labor efforts are   77 
unobservable will condition their transfers on their children’s earnings.  In this setting, 
government redistribution between parents and children can modify the self-selection 
constraints under which parents operate in establishing their earnings-related transfer 
functions.  In this case, the policy will be non neutral.  
  Feldstein (1988) raised another important theoretical objection to the Barro 
model, namely that, in  the context of uncertainty, Ricardian  equivalence will only hold if 
transfers are operative in all states of nature in which the government’s redistribution 
occurs.  Take parents who are altruistic, but whose altruism is not strong enough to lead 
them to  make transfers to their children if their children end up with higher incomes than 
their own.  Then government redistribution from children to parents will generate no 
private offset in the form of higher bequests or intervivos gifts in those states of nature in 
which the children would otherwise be better off than the parents.  In developed 
economies in which per capita incomes grow through time, one would expect Feldstein’s 
point to be particularly applicable.  
 
Testing Intergenerational Altruism 
As mentioned, the Barro Model of intergenerational altruism predicts that the 
consumption of altruistically linked individuals is independent of the distribution of 
resources across those individuals.  This implication has been tested in a variety of ways 
with a v ariety of data.  Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985) took the Barro model as the null 
hypotheses and used dynamic programming to determine the level of annual consumption 
that would be demanded by Barro dynasties given earnings and rate of return uncertainty.   
They estimated their model on postwar U.S. time series data and tested whether the cross-  78 
cohort distribution of resources matters to aggregate consumption given the level of 
consumption predicted by the Barro Model.  The authors report a very strong dependence 
of aggregate consumption on the intergenerational distribution of resources. 
Abel and Kotlikoff (1994) pointed out that altruistically linked households will 
automatically share risk and, therefore, experience identical shocks (Euler errors) to their 
marginal utilities of consumption.  They also showed that changes in the average Euler 
error by cohort would share this property if, as Barro believed, the economy was 
dominated by intergenerational altruists.  Abel and Kotlikoff aggregated by cohort U.S. 
consumer expenditure data to test for the commonality of Euler errors.  Their test 
strongly rejects intergenerational altruism; cohorts that experience positive income 
shocks spend, rather than share, their good fortune.  
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) and Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) 
use Panel Study of Income Dynamics data on the consumption of extended family 
members to test whether a) the distribution of consumption of extended family members 
depends on the distribution of resources among those members and b) whether extended 
family members share risk  – an implication not simply of altruism, but also selfish risk 
sharing.  The data strongly reject both propositions.  Another study by the three authors 
(Altonji, Kotlikoff, and Hayashi 1997) considers the subset of extended PSID families 
who were actively making transfers among themselves.  They showed that taking a dollar 
from a child and giving it to a parent who is giving the child money results in an increase 
in transfers to the child of  only 13 cents  – an amount that is not only small, but also 
insignificantly different from zero.    79 
Additional compelling evidence against the Barro view is provided by Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1996).  This article documents that the dramatic postwar 
decline in U.S. saving has been the result of an equally dramatic increase in 
intergenerational transfers to the elderly that have led to an enormous increase in their 
absolute and relative consumption.  Since 1960 the consumption of the elderly, on a per 
person basis, has roughly doubled relative to that of young adults.  A related finding, 
developed in Auerbach, Gokhale, Kotlikoff, Sabelhaus, and Weil (2001), is the dramatic 
postwar increase in the annuitization of the resources of the elderly.  This increased 
annuitization has been engineered primarily by the government, which provides the 
elderly substantial resources in old age in the form of cash and medical benefits that 
continue until they die, but aren’t bequeathable.  If Barro were right, and the elderly were 
altruistic, they would have responded to their being forced to acquire more annuities by 
purchasing more life insurance.  In fact, the life insurance holdings of the elderly have 
not increased in the postwar period as a share of their remaining lifetime resources.   
They’ve declined. 
 
VIII.  The Government’s Role in Intergenerational Risk Sharing 
Samuelson’s (1958) classic consumption-loan model pointed out the inherent 
incompleteness in markets arising from the fact that agents alive at one p oint in time 
can’t contract with those who will be born well after those agents are deceased.  This 
market failure is manifest primarily in the area of risk sharing.  Were they able to 
contract, agents alive today and those born in the future could form risk-sharing 
arrangements by buying or selling state-contingent contracts of various kinds.  The   80 
question raised by these missing markets is whether the government can redistribute 
across generations to emulate, if not replicate, the risk-sharing arrangements that 
members of different cohorts would privately conclude.  
As shown in Kotlikoff (1993), it’s an easy matter to extend the two-period model 
of Section III to include uncertainty both with respect to the economic environment and 
government policy.  Kotlikoff (1993) considers uncertain technology, specifically the 
coefficient of total factor productivity, as well as uncertain (i.e., state-contingent) 
government net payments each period from the young to the old.  The role for 
government intergenerational  risk sharing in this model is to transfer resources from the 
contemporaneous young to the contemporaneous old at time t if the technology at time t 
is better than at time t-1.  The degree of redistribution would also be conditioned on the 
economy’s time-t capital stock.   
The fact that government’s can pool risks across generations doesn’t mean they 
necessarily do so.  Indeed, governments may exacerbate the degree of uncertainty facing 
generations by randomly distributing among them.  As Auerbach and Hassett (1999) 
point out, this manufacturing of uncertainty may come in the form of simply delaying the 
decision of who will pay the government’s bills.  Take, as an example, the current failure 
of the U.S. government to determine how it will close the very sizeable imbalance in U.S. 
generational policy.  The government can either place a larger fiscal burden on the 
current elderly, on middle-aged baby boomers, on the current young, or on future 
generations.  The size of the bill is reasonably clear.  But in failing to specify 
immediately which generations will pay what, the U.S. government is generating 
uncertainty for all generations, where none intrinsically exists.     81 
Can one say whether the government is, on balance, pooling risk across 
generations? Yes and no.
27 Abel and Kotlikoff (1994) stress that their study tests and 
strongly rejects intergenerational risk sharing, no matter whether that risk sharing is 
arising from a) altruistic extended family behavior, b) selfish extended family 
arrangements, c) the purchase of contracts and securities in private insurance and 
financial markets, or d) government policy.  But Abel and Kotlikoff’s study doesn’t tell 
us the precise role, if any, played by the government in frustrating or improving 
intergenerational risk sharing.  
    
IX. Conclusion 
  Generational policy  – the question of which generation will pay the government’s 
bills  -- lies at the heart of most fiscal policy debates.  The importance of this issue has 
stimulated a prodigious amount of theoretical, empirical,  and simulation research.  This 
research has delivered some important findings.  First, which generation pays the 
government’s bills is, apart from efficiency considerations, a zero-sum game.  Second, 
generational policy works not just by redistributing resources directly across generations, 
but also by redistributing resources indirectly via policy-induced general equilibrium 
changes in factor prices.  Third, the same generational policy can be conducted under a 
variety of headings and operate through surprising channels, including asset markets.  
Fourth, notwithstanding its ubiquitous use, the budget deficit is not a well-defined 
measure of generational or any other aspect of economic policy.  The same is true of 
taxes and transfer payments as well as their associated constructs, such as disposable 
                                                                 
27 Note that the government may pool risks within generations at the same time it generates risks across 
generations.  Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes’ (1995) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) are two important studies   82 
income and personal saving.  Fifth, generational accounting represents an important, but 
far from perfect method of assessing generational policy.  Sixth, generational policies in 
non-altruistic economies can effect major redistribution across generations and major 
changes in the long-run values of key macroeconomic variables.  Seventh, generational 
policies take a fairly long time to effect the economy.  Eighth, intergenerational altruism 
can nullify the impact of generational policy, but the theoretical conditions under which it 
would arise are highly unlikely to prevail.  Ninth, there is a plethora of evidence, at least 
for the U.S., that intergenerational redistribution, be it across cohorts or between older 
and younger members of the same extended families, materially raises the well being to 
those receiving the transfers and materially harms those making the payments.  Tenth, at 
least in the U.S., government policy does not achieve intergenerational risk sharing.  
Indeed, U.S. government policy may, on balance, be an important, if not the primary 
source of generational risk.  Finally, and most important, a variety of countries around the 
world are running generational policies that will dramatically reduce the e conomic well 
being of their future generations.  Achieving generational balance in those countries 
requires immediate, major, and highly painful policy responses.  
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Table 1 The Composition of Male U.S. Generational Accounts 
 
(present values in thousands of 1998 dollars)  
 
               Tax Payments                              Transfer Receipts 
______________________________________________      ______________________________ 
 
Age in  Net Tax  Income  Income  Payroll  Excise    OASDI MEDICARE MEDICAID Welfare 
1998    Payment  Taxes   Taxes   Taxes    Taxes 
 
 0       249.7   128.3    61.8   107.3    93.4       45.2    24.0    58.1    13.7 
 5       256.4   136.3    66.0   114.1    97.4       48.0    35.9    58.9    14.6 
10       272.3   147.1    71.8   123.1   102.1       51.7    44.2    60.2    15.8 
15       291.4   158.4    77.9   132.8   105.9       55.4    50.5    60.6    17.1 
20       318.7   171.2    85.4   143.8   107.5       59.0    51.9    59.9    18.3 
25       327.3   174.5    91.6   145.7   102.4       61.2    52.5    55.2    17.8 
30       313.7   167.8    98.2   138.1    95.9       64.6    55.2    49.9    16.5 
35       279.2   153.9   104.5   124.3    89.4       69.4    63.7    45.0    14.9 
40       241.4   137.1   110.0   108.9    83.2       76.4    67.4    40.4    13.5 
45       194.2   116.1   113.0    91.2    75.5       85.5    67.9    35.9    12.3 
50       129.7    93.0   112.4    71.8    65.6       95.6    75.4    31.0    11.1 
55        66.2    65.5   108.4    50.4    56.0      108.1    69.7    26.3    10.0 
60        -5.8    38.0   100.5    29.1    46.4      123.1    66.1    21.8     9.0 
65       -77.5    16.6    89.5    12.7    37.2      138.5    69.3    17.7     8.0 
70       -91.0     6.8    76.3     5.1    28.4      129.7    56.2    14.8     7.0 
75       -75.1     3.3    61.3     2.4    20.8      106.5    38.2    12.5     5.7 
80       -56.3     1.4    46.1     1.2    14.6       85.7    20.2     9.7     4.0 
85       -42.4      .5    33.0      .5    10.1       67.0     9.0     8.0     2.6 
90       -25.6      .4    28.5      .4     7.9       51.7     3.1     6.0     2.0 
 
Growth-Adjusted Net Tax Payment of Future Generations 361.8 
 
Lifetime Net Tax Rate on Future Generations  32.3 percent 
Lifetime Net Tax Rate on Newborns        22.8 percent 
Generational Imbalance                                                41.7 percent 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Table assumes a 4 percent real discount rate and 2.2 percent growth rate.   88 
 
Table 1 (continued) 
 
The Composition of Female U.S. Generational Accounts 
 
                         (present values in thousands of 1998 dollars) 
 
                           Tax Payments                    Transfer Receipts 
                 _______________________________     _____________________________ 
                 Labor   Capital 
Age in  Net Tax  Income  Income  Payroll  Excise    OASDI MEDICARE MEDICAID Welfare 
1998    Payment  Taxes   Taxes   Taxes    Taxes 
 
 0       109.6    67.8    21.6    64.1    89.0       42.3    24.6    44.0    22.0 
 5       104.6    72.1    23.0    68.2    92.7       45.0    38.3    44.7    23.4 
10       104.6    77.9    25.1    73.7    97.0       48.7    48.8    46.1    25.6 
15       105.4    84.1    27.2    79.6    99.9       52.4    57.9    46.9    28.2 
20       113.7    91.0    29.8    86.2   100.9       56.4    61.1    46.9    29.9 
25       112.3    91.5    31.8    86.4    96.6       58.9    63.7    45.2    26.2 
30        95.6    85.1    33.9    79.9    91.2       61.9    68.0    43.2    21.3 
35        65.6    75.6    35.9    70.8    85.7       65.7    78.6    41.1    17.0 
40        37.9    66.0    37.9    62.0    79.7       71.4    83.7    39.3    13.3 
45         7.9    55.4    39.2    52.1    72.7       78.8    84.7    37.6    10.4 
50       -37.7    42.2    39.6    39.6    64.4       87.7    94.1    33.5     8.2 
55       -73.9    28.3    39.1    26.6    55.2       99.0    87.5    29.8     6.8 
60      -115.0    15.6    37.4    14.7    46.0      112.7    84.0    26.2     5.8 
65      -157.6     6.6    34.6     6.1    36.9      124.6    89.3    22.6     5.2 
70      -155.9     2.5    30.8     2.2    28.7      116.8    78.7    20.0     4.6 
75      -131.8      .9    26.3      .9    21.3      100.0    59.6    17.9     3.8 
80       -99.2      .3    21.5      .3    15.3       82.1    36.9    14.5     3.1 
85       -70.5      .2    16.9      .1    11.1       63.4    20.6    12.5     2.4 
90       -44.4      .1    14.1      .1     8.3       47.3     9.0     8.9     1.8 
 
Future 
Generations     158.8 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Table assumes a 4 percent real discount rate and 2.2 percent growth rate.   89 
 Table 2     Alternative Policies to Achieve Generational Balance*  in the U.S. 
 
 
           Immediate and Permanent            Equalized 
                                                Percentage Change                           Lifetime  
Policy                  in Policy Instrument                       Net Tax Rate 
 
Raise All Taxes                              12.0          27.5 
Raise Fed. Inc. Taxes                          31.3          27.3 
Cut All Transfers                                21.9                                           26.5 
Cut All Govt. Purchases                     21.0                                           22.8 
Cut Federal Purchases                        66.3                                           22.8 
________________________________________________________________________ 
* Generational imbalance is the percentage difference in lifetime net tax rates of newborns and future generations.     90 
Table 3     Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance in 22 Countries 
 













Argentina  29.1  11.0  8.4  75.7 
Australia  10.2  9.1  4.8  8.1 
Austria  76.4  20.5  18.4  55.6 
Belgium  12.4  4.6  3.1  10.0 
Brazil  26.2  17.9  11.7  74.0 
Canada  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Denmark  29.0  4.5  4.0  6.7 
Finland  67.6  21.2  19.4  50.8 
Germany  25.9  14.1  9.5  29.5 
Ireland  -4.3  -4.4  -2.1  -4.8 
Italy  49.1  13.3  10.5  28.2 
Japan  29.5  25.3  15.5  53.6 
Netherlands  28.7  22.3  8.9  15.6 
New Zealand  -1.6  -0.6  -0.4  -0.8 
Norway  9.9  8.1  6.3  9.7 
Portugal  9.8  7.5  4.2  13.3 
Spain  62.2  17.0  14.5  44.9 
Sweden  50.5  18.9  15.6  41.9 
Thailand  -47.7  -114.2  -25.0  -81.8 
France  22.2  9.8  6.9  64.0 
United Kingdom  9.7  9.5  2.7  9.5 
United States  21.0  21.9  12.0  31.3 
na – not available 






Structural Tax Reform in the Auerbach-Kotlikoff Model 
 
 






1  89.9  19.2  25.7  1.000  .071  .000  .035 
2  89.9  19.5  25.9  .997  .072  .064  .054 
3  90.4  19.5  25.9  .998  .072  .064  .053 
4  90.8  19.5  25.9  1.000  .071  .064  .052 
5  91.3  19.4  26.0  1.001  .071  .064  .051 
10  91.7  19.4  26.0  1.003  .071  .063  .050 
20  95.5  19.3  26.1  1.015  .068  .061  .042 
60  97.2  19.2  26.1  1.021  .067  .061  .037 
¥  97.3  19.2  26.1  1.021  .067  .061  .037 
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Table 4 
 
Comparing Changes in Generation’s Utility and their Generational Accounts 
(changes, expressed as percent of remaining lifetime economic resources) 
 
Generation’s Year of 
Birth 
Change in Generational 
Account  
Change in Utility 
-54  -2.39  -2.41 
-50  -2.13  -2.03 
-45  -1.64  -1.60 
-40  -1.16  -1.22 
-35  -0.72  -0.87 
-30  -0.36  -0.55 
-25  -0.06  -0.26 
-20  0.17  -0.01 
-15  0.32  0.21 
-10  0.40  0.37 
-5  0.41  0.49 
0  0.37  0.55 
5  0.36  0.68 
10  0.35  0.80 
20  0.34  0.94 
50  0.33  1.04 
¥  0.33  1.05 
Source: Fehr and Kotlikoff (1997) 




    Proportional Consumption-Tax Reform 
 
Impact on Macro Variables 
 
  1996 1997 2010 2145
Aggregates 
National Income Index  1.000 1.044 1.063 1.094
Capital Stock
 Index  1.000 1.010 1.108 1.254
Labor Supply
 Index  1.000 1.063 1.054 1.046
Net Saving Rate  0.051 0.073 0.067 0.059
Wage Rates, Interest Rates, and Asset Values 
Before-Tax Wage
 Index  1.000 0.987 1.013 1.046
After-Tax Wage  0.775 0.817 0.843 0.881
Interest Rate   0.083 0.079 0.076 0.073
Federal Consumption and Payroll Tax Rates 
Consumption Tax Rate
[3]  0  0.166 0.160 0.145
Payroll Tax Rate  0.146 0.140 0.140 0.141
 
             Source: Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) 




Welfare Effects of 





Cohort Born in 
Year -54 











1  1.01  .97  .94  .95  .96 
3  1.00  .99  .98  .99  .99 
6  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.01  1.01 
9  .99  1.0  1.01  1.02  102 
12  .99  1.02  1.03  1.04  1.04 
    Note: Welfare is measured relative to the no-reform equilibrium. A value, for example,  
of .97 means that the group in question experiences a welfare change from the reform  
that is equivalent to their experiencing a 3 percent decline in consumption and leisure at  
each age under the initial fiscal structure.  
Source: Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) 
 




    Privatizing Social Security with Consumption-
Tax Transitional Finance  
 
Percentage Change in Macro Variables Relative to 
Initial Steady State 
 
               Year of Transition:  5  10  25  150 
Macro Variable 
National Income  .6  1.3  4.9  13.0 
Capital Stock  1.8  4.1  12.8  39.0 
Labor Supply  .3  .4  2.4  5.5 
Before-Tax Wage  .4  0.9  2.4  7.1 
Interest Rate  -1.1  -2.7  -6.9  -18.9 
             Source: Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001)       
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Table 8  
 
Privatizing Social Security – Percentage Change in Remaining Lifetime 
Utility for Selected Income Classes by Cohort 
 
        Cohort Year of Birth Relative to Initial Steady State 
                      Class          -54            -25           -10              1             10            25            150 
1  .7  -2.1  -.6  .5  1.3  3.2  6.0 
3  -.4  -2.0  .0  1.2  2.1  4.2  7.4 
6  -.9  -1.7  .3  1.6  2.6  4.8  8.0 
9  -1.2  -1.6  .5  1.7  2.7  4.9  8.1 
12  -1.5  -2.5  -1.8  -1.0  -.1  1.7  4.4 
     Source: Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001)       
 